What did the Atlantic Community mean for the nations of North America and Western Europe during the 1960s and early 1970s? This book, spanning the period from presidents Kennedy to Nixon, offers a wide-ranging set of views on this topic. National perspectives from the main protagonists—the United States, Britain, France, and West Germany—are complemented by studies on the role of non-state institutions, and public diplomacy in maintaining close transatlantic relations. The book moves from the high optimism of the Kennedy years, with the attempt to refashion transatlantic relations around two more equal poles in the United States and a uniting Europe, to the series of disagreements and disputes that energised transatlantic diplomacy during the Nixon years. In doing so, the book provides a unique overview of the main trends and troubles of the transatlantic relationship during a critical period, and shows how various channels—both diplomatic and non-diplomatic—were used to overcome them and maintain a strong alliance.
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Atlantic Community and Europe

Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America?

edited by

Giles Scott-Smith
and Valérie Aubourg

Soleb
summary

Introduction

Valérie Aubourg and Giles Scott-Smith 8

Transatlantic Perspectives 17

Ambitions and Ambivalence: Initiatives for a European Nuclear Force, 1957-67

Ine Megens 18

Better Imperfect than Divided: Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns and NATO, 1956-71

Albert Kersten 38

The End of Symbiosis: The Nixon era and the Collapse of Comfortable Co-existence between European and Atlantic Integration

N. Piers Ludlow 60
National Visions—France

General de Gaulle’s Challenge to the Atlantic Community, 1958-69
  Garret Martin

The Atlantic Community and de Gaulle’s European Ideal: A Reconsideration of the French withdrawal from Military NATO
  Carolyne Davidson

The Troubled Partnership, encore et toujours: Pompidou, Nixon, Kissinger, and the New Atlanticism
  Nicolas Vaičbourdt

National Visions—USA

Running for President of the West: Kennedy’s European Trip in June 1963
  Thomas W. Gijswijt

George W. Ball, the Multilateral Force and the Transatlantic Alliance
  Andrew Priest
summary

The State Department’s Bureau of European Affairs in the 1970s

Kenneth Weisbrode 192

Engaging Europe: The Transition of US Public Diplomacy, 1961-76

Nicholas J. Cull 208

National Visions—Germany 236

West Germany between French and American Conceptions of the European and Atlantic Communities, 1960-68

Klaus Schwabe 238

“Scenes from a Marriage”: East-West Détente and its Impact on the Atlantic Community, 1961-77

Oliver Bange 262

The Kissinger-Bahr Back-Channel within US-West German Relations 1969-74

Gottfried Niedhart 284
National Visions—The UK

Reconciling the Irreconcilable? Britain, the Atlantic Community and European Unity, 1950-70
James Ellison

Heath’s Vision of Europe and Kissinger’s Reappraisal of US Policy
Niklas Rossbach

Transatlantic Networks

Educating the Capitals: Dirk Stikker’s Struggle for Transatlantic Unity, 1958–64
Christian Nuenlist

“For Better or for Worse”? The Bilderberg Meetings and the Lockheed Affair
Ingeborg Philipsen

Atlantic Dreams: Leonard Tennyson and the European Delegation in Washington DC during the 1960s
Giles Scott-Smith
summary


Valérie Aubourg 416

Strains in the Alliance: Europe and Beyond 444

Trading Human Rights for Base Rights: John F. Kennedy, Africa and the Azores Base

Luís N. Rodrigues 446

The Transatlantic Relationship and the End of Bretton Woods, 1969-71

Duccio Basosi 468

European Unity and the Transatlantic Gulf in 1973

Marloes C. Beers 486

Reconciling Political Identity and Atlantic Partnership: Europe and the Middle East Crisis of 1973-74

John Sakkas 506
Restoring Atlantic Unity: The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis 1973-74

Duco Hellema

526

The Eurocommunism Years: Italy’s Political Puzzle and the Limits of the Atlantic Alliance

Laura Fasanaro

548

Conclusion

Valérie Aubourg and Giles Scott-Smith

577

Index

584
Introduction

Valérie Aubourg
and Giles Scott-Smith
“**The first order of business** is for our European friends to go forward in forming the more perfect union which will someday make this partnership possible […] . Building the Atlantic partnership now will not be easily or cheaply finished.

But I will say here and now, on this Day of Independence, that the United States will be ready for a Declaration of Interdependence, that we will be prepared to discuss with a united Europe the ways and means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in Europe and the old American Union founded here 175 years ago.”


“**It must be agreed** that first the entry of Great Britain, and then these States, will completely change the whole of the actions, the agreements, the compensation, the rules which have already been established between the Six […] .

Further, this community, increasing in such fashion, would see itself faced with problems of economic relations with all kinds of other States, and first with the United States. It is to be foreseen that the cohesion of its members, who would be very numerous and diverse, would not endure for long, and that ultimately it would appear as a colossal Atlantic community under American dependence and direction, and which would quickly have absorbed the community of Europe.”

The perspectives of Kennedy and de Gaulle, as exemplified by the excerpts from these pivotal speeches, effectively bracket the conduct of transatlantic diplomatic relations during the 1960s. The processes of European integration during the 1960s, fuelled by national economies that had overcome post-war reconstruction and rearmament, posed a series of dilemmas for the continuing projection of US power across the Atlantic.

Kennedy, while respecting the new Europe, called on Europeans to accept a rejuvenated US leadership that was willing—to an extent—to trade responsibility for burden-sharing. De Gaulle, while acknowledging the need to maintain the US security commitment to Europe, was protective of French autonomy and looked to provide an alternative pole for European development outside of US hegemony. The rhetorical flourishes and clashes of interest represented by Kennedy and de Gaulle were effectively still setting the tone for US-European relations as played out by Kissinger and Pompidou a decade later. Much attention has been given to judging to what extent US foreign policy failed to match up to the Kennedy demand through the decade, with talk of missed opportunities counteracted by claims of relative success. Yet as the essays in this volume demonstrate, there were many sides to these relations, and the Kennedy-de Gaulle face-off, while offering a prominent framework through which to analyse this period, does not come close to covering the complex manoeuvring that went on in both governmental and non-governmental circles.


3 For a recent study that does unpack the complex linkages between governmental with
For a start, as made clear in the first volume to this series, the “space of Atlanticism”—politically, economically, culturally, cerebrally—is hard to define.4 While the European community was relatively easy to identify (even if its institutional end-point was not), “the term ‘Atlantic community’ is somewhat more vague,” as a research document from 1962 stated:

“It is sometimes used to refer to an extension of the NATO concept, adding economic, cultural, and, perhaps, political dimensions to the existing partnership. At other times, it refers to long-range aspirations, as yet not officially expressed, to create a closer economic and political community, perhaps with constitutional implications, among the nations bordering the Atlantic. The phrase is also used in connection with efforts to strengthen the relations between the Western allies by short-term programs, particularly in the educational and cultural fields. Even the geographic area of the ‘Atlantic community’ is imprecise, some taking it to include Latin America, others limiting it to Western Europe and North America.5”

The scope of transatlantic cooperation as suggested by the phrase Atlantic Community therefore covers a whole spectrum of activities, from low-level cultural diplomacy and the fostering of “mutual understanding”, to the ambitions of institution-building and forms of Atlanticist (con)federalism. During the 1960s this spectrum was operating in and responding to a changing international context—a more self-confident Europe, able and willing to organise its own affairs, and requiring the United States to accept a more

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balanced relationship. As one study has stated, Western leaders were preoccupied with three “primary problems” in the early 1960s: Berlin (including NATO nuclear strategy), European integration, and international finance. These three issues were at the forefront a decade later, only the dynamic had changed. The Berlin issue was largely settled by the Four Power Agreement of September 1971, a prominent move not so much in terms of superpower rapprochement but in the sense of a Federal Republic of Germany determined to push ahead with Ostpolitik and resolve the long-standing stalemate in central Europe. Following the Hague summit of 1969 the European Community (EC) laid the basis for British membership, presenting the prospect of an EC able to balance the economic power of the United States.

The potential economic and financial threat that this represented for US interests was taken seriously by Washington in the early 1970s. Lastly, international finance would enter troubled waters with both the suspension of the dollar’s convertibility into gold in August 1971 and the beginnings of the EC’s long road towards a single currency, requiring an overhaul of the international financial management system. In all three cases the transatlantic relationship was coming under pressure from shifting coalitions of West European states looking to set out their national (and common) interests in key policy fields in a more determined fashion.

This is not to suggest that the United States suddenly failed to get its way from 1960 onwards—the post-World War II transatlantic relationship was always defined by negotiation, even during the late 1940s when US influence was at its height. Nevertheless, it is clear that the dynamic of these negotiations changed through the 1960s and early 1970s—the decade was not only crucial, but also transitional.

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7 For recent work on transatlantic relations through the 1970s that explore more nuanced European perspectives, see Matthias Schulz & Thomas Schwartz (eds.), *The Strained Alliance: US-European*
This is best illustrated by the events of 1973 and beyond, covered here in several essays. The optimism of Kennedy’s triumphant European tour of 1962 had long disappeared, and while Kissinger tried to re-invigorate the transatlantic relationship through his “Year of Europe” speech, his effort was instead received across the Atlantic as another unwelcome attempt by Washington to define the parameters of European ambition. Middle East politics and the oil crisis subsequently confirmed that American and European world views were noticeably divergent, with Eurocommunism rising in the background as new terrain for disagreement.

Needless to say, these transitions have already generated a great deal of scholarly attention. This volume, like its predecessor,\(^8\) intends to build on this impressive foundation in three principal ways. Firstly, it contains some of the most recent research that, using a variety of sources and coming from different national perspectives, seeks to re-evaluate the diplomacy of the 1960s and early 1970s. Secondly, it seeks to move beyond the predominant focus on government-to-government transactions in diplomatic history by combining these approaches with studies on the role and influence of non-state actors and influential individuals (both inside and outside government). Thirdly, it aims to test the limits to the Atlantic Community concept, limits which would only become visible in times of serious political discord. These limits, \textit{pace} de Gaulle, became most acute during the 1970s when the reconfiguring of US leadership under Nixon and Kissinger coincided with major set-backs for an ambitious EC and a more self-confident West Germany in

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pursuit of Ostpolitik. As some of the authors here argue, while the alliance ultimately came out of these struggles well, there were still plenty of disagreements and tensions along the way.

In setting these goals, the volume builds up a more in-depth understanding of the texture, layers and connections at work in the Atlantic region during a vital period. Ultimately, the Community was a way of thinking as much as it was an official alliance, highlighting the need to trace how this impacted on conceptions of national interest. As one might expect, the resulting picture points to the fact that while many political leaders referred to an Atlantic Community, it was more the private nongovernmental groups which exemplified and promoted it as a vital formation beyond the nation state. The interaction of private and public circuits therefore becomes all the more important in order to understand how the interface between ideas and policy took shape over time. Overall, the book does not claim to adopt the perspective of transnational history, but there is certainly an empathy with that approach.⁹

To conclude, it is apparent that the Atlantic Community provided a vision around which various nations could congregate and pursue their separate but necessarily intertwined goals. From the mid-1970s onwards the phrase seems to disappear from political discourse, the vision having run dry and the needs of global management requiring new formations and new partners beyond the US-Europe relationship (for instance the Trilateral Commission in 1973, the G5 in 1975, the expansion of the Organisation for

⁹ “While the history of the modern age had been […] written from a national perspective, the last twenty years have witnessed the mounting of an explicit challenge to this position […] We are interested in links and flows, and want to track people, ideas, products, processes and patterns that operate over, across, through, beyond, above, under, or in-between polities and societies. Among the units that were thus crossed, consolidated or subverted in the modern age, first and foremost were the national ones…” “Introduction,” in Akira Iriye and Pierre-Yves Saunier (eds.), *The Palgrave Dictionary of Transnational History*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.xviii.
Economic Cooperation and Development). But it has returned in spirit in the form of recent proposals for a ‘community’ or ‘concert of democracies’ that look to galvanise the effectiveness of like-minded nations in new forms of global problem-solving. It is similar to the Atlantic Community concept in three ways. Firstly, it seeks to blend national interests around a common cause of promoting universally-applicable values (such as human rights) for the benefit of all. Secondly, the sense is that without real power-sharing this shall be another benevolent cover for US hegemonic leadership. Lastly, there is a strong sense that it will also remain no more than a vision—although, as in the past, a vision with real influence.

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1 Transatlantic Perspectives
Ambitions and Ambivalence: Initiatives for a European Nuclear Force, 1957-67

Ine Megens
In matters of defence the Atlantic option was predominant in Western Europe from the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 onwards. Nuclear weapons were of vital importance to defend the European continent, and the American nuclear guarantee was a crucial element of the transatlantic security system. Yet from the mid 1950s onwards debates on nuclear strategy and détente between the superpowers cast doubts on this nuclear guarantee, and new cooperative initiatives in the field of nuclear politics began to develop in Europe. This article gives a broad overview of the various impulses involved in the field of nuclear policy in Europe, and discusses whether a European nuclear force was a viable alternative to the American nuclear guarantee from the late 1950s up to the mid 1960s.¹

Initial Plans and First Steps

Initial plans for a European nuclear force were formulated by individuals such as the French General Juin as early as 1954.² These were only tentative suggestions and they had no backing from their respective governments. The demise of the European Defence Community in August 1954 forestalled any plans for nuclear arms cooperation at the European level. However, in the field of nuclear energy prospects for European integration seemed more promising. Advocates for European cooperation like Jean Monnet and Paul-Henri Spaak were convinced that such plans stood a good chance. Nuclear energy required huge investments which made private firms hesitant, and therefore there were fewer vested interests involved. During the negotiations for the European Atomic

¹ Due to the broad range of the topic references to primary documents have been kept to a minimum.
Energy Community (Euratom) it was decided early on that European cooperation in atomic energy should be used only for nonmilitary goals. At the same time, these talks demonstrated exactly that civil and military usage of atomic energy were inextricably bound up. What is more, France envisaged Euratom as a means to safeguard the development of a French nuclear deterrent.\(^3\) French attempts to secure American cooperation in nuclear matters had failed repeatedly, and American interference restrained the British from assisting them as well.\(^4\) The establishment of an isotope separation plant therefore was one of the main aims of the French government during the talks on Euratom. Due to US influence this element of the plan was put on ice, as Washington instead offered enriched uranium for a fair price on the condition it should only be employed for civil use. Most European countries considered the American proposal attractive and did not bother about the restrictive measures.

The French, however, accepted the American offer only reluctantly, thus enabling the establishment of an atomic European organization with limited aims. Euratom would not provide fissionable material for nuclear weapons, although the treaty did not forbid a nation state from using atomic energy for military purposes. During the negotiations the German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had in fact consented tacitly to French nuclear ambitions.\(^5\) The French parliament agreed in August 1957 to include a uranium enrichment plant in the new national five-year plan in order to produce enriched fissile material, which could be used for electricity as well as for the propulsion


of nuclear submarines and for nuclear weapons.\(^6\) International developments at the end of the year further induced France to officially decide to create a national nuclear arsenal and stimulate new initiatives in the field of military cooperation in Europe.

The launching of the Sputnik satellite in October 1957 caused a major shock in the West, as it demonstrated that the US was vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack using ballistic missiles. Simultaneously the Bermuda conference, where President Eisenhower committed himself to exchange nuclear information with the British, made transatlantic nuclear relations all the more awkward. European displeasure at Anglo-American nuclear cooperation, criticism of nuclear strategy, and growing doubts on the American willingness to launch nuclear weapons in case of a Russian attack on Europe all came together at the same time.

In November 1957 the French government decided to initiate nuclear cooperation between France, Germany and Italy. A trilateral agreement was signed that instigated a programme to produce advanced military equipment, comprising both conventional and nuclear weapons systems. The plans were not completely new and have to be considered as a general desire for increased collaboration and the realisation of previous discussions.\(^7\) Simultaneously the three countries duly submitted proposals to NATO to increase cooperation within the alliance.

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The meeting of the North Atlantic Council of December 1957 was meant to give new vigour to the alliance in the wake of the Soviet Sputnik satellite launch. It was also the first meeting ever of the heads of state of the member countries. At the meeting the United States offered to establish stocks of nuclear warheads and to deploy intermediate range ballistic missiles Thor and Jupiter in Europe. At the same time the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, made clear that the McMahon Act prohibited the transfer of nuclear bombs. Nuclear weapons in Europe would be deployed under a dual-key arrangement, meaning that the use of these weapons could only come as the result of a joint decision by the US and the host country. American proposals also included a suggestion to develop a coordinated NATO research, development and production programme in Europe for a select group of advanced weapons. The United States stated their willingness to support this effort by way of the American military assistance programme.8

The European countries were not impressed by the American plans as the dual-key arrangement did not satisfy their wish for more control, and it failed to meet existing political concerns. As a result France, Italy and Germany continued their trilateral contacts and quickly agreed on a programme of action. The cooperation among the continents seemed to get off to a good start. In April 1958 the three Ministers of Defence agreed on the joint development and production of weapons. Simultaneously the three countries submitted a list of seven new weapons systems to be developed in NATO.9 The NATO proposal demonstrates that the European option was not considered in isolation from Alliance commitments, and for the Germans in particular it was never meant to be an end in itself.10

8 Working papers submitted by delegations, Annex B Expanded NATO Co-operation in the Military Field – Item III of the agenda. RDC(57)428 (final), 5 December 1957, NATO Archives, Brussels (hereafter “NATO”).
9 Communication by the Defence Ministers of the French Republic, of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the Italian Republic to NATO and the WEU, 16 April 1958, C-MI(58)65, NATO.
The French-Italian-German initiative created uneasiness and suspicion among the British, and London tried to broaden it to include all members of the West European Union, offering military advice and financial support at the same time. With American approval the British also proposed to France to discuss opportunities for common production of ballistic missiles, in particular the Blue Streak. For the British this was merely a fallback position in case their preferred solution for British defence problems—an American intermediate-range ballistic missile—turned out to be impossible. Either out of necessity or by their own volition, and with or without the British, joint production and common research and development looked like the obvious way forward for nuclear politics in continental Europe. However, the situation changed when General de Gaulle came to power in France in June 1958.

**Cooperation in the Field of Military Production**

One of the first acts of Charles de Gaulle was to put an end to plans for nuclear cooperation with Germany and Italy. The relevant part of the trilateral programme of the continental countries was cancelled. Within weeks after he assumed office de Gaulle also made his views on defence known to Secretary of State Dulles. France was determined to become a nuclear power and would accept American help to this end on the condition that France would both own and control these weapons. De Gaulle also made clear he was not satisfied

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Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America?

Initiatives for a European Nuclear Force

with NATO as France had global responsibilities and the geographical area covered by the alliance was limited. The meeting was followed by a now rather famous memorandum of 17 September in which France proposed the establishment of a tripartite organization on a political level to take decisions on security, notably on nuclear matters. The American response was “a polite but blunt refusal,” as Frédéric Bozo has stated. Nevertheless the tripartite proposal would remain the centre of de Gaulle’s Atlantic policy for the following two years. French grandeur required both an independent nuclear force and recognition of her position as one of the three world powers in the West. It did not necessitate a disengagement from NATO and the force de frappe was still in its planning stage. But de Gaulle soon became disappointed because the US was unwilling to grant France a primary role in the control over American nuclear weapons stored in France. As a result 200 American F-100 bombers were redeployed and moved to Great Britain and Germany. The deployment of nuclear IRBM missiles on French soil, as decided in NATO at the end of 1957, became out of the question when the French insisted on full authority. However, France did accept American tactical Honest John missiles and Nike anti-aircraft missiles for its forces in Germany.

The Americans had also promised to help France build a nuclear submarine, but this project too ran into difficulties. American policymakers argued that secrecy, as requested under American law, could not be guaranteed in France and revealing nuclear information involved considerable security risks. The promised nuclear engine was never delivered, while supplies of

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nuclear fuel amounted only to a third of what was necessary.\textsuperscript{14} The French were even more bitter about the American behaviour when they learned of the conditions for nuclear exchange between the US and the United Kingdom. According to new legislation enacted in 1958, only Britain qualified for US assistance because it had already achieved substantial progress in developing its own nuclear weapons. At the same time there was also a noticeable interest on the British side in joint procurement with the French. In particular Peter Thorneycroft, the British Minister of Defence, was known to be a supporter of this cooperation.\textsuperscript{15} Apart from political reasons, London had strong economic motives to promote cooperation with France as closer cooperation between the continental countries might jeopardize British military-industrial capability. The close Anglo-American military cooperation in nuclear matters, however, put severe restrictions on any collaboration with third countries, as it required US permission.

Bilateral contacts to encourage defence cooperation among other European countries were more promising. The German Minister of Defence, Franz Josef Strauss, had been a staunch supporter of a greater role for Germany in the alliance from the first moment he entered office in 1956. He emphasized the need to treat Germany as an equal partner and to equip the German military with nuclear weapons. He showed great interest in receiving information regarding advanced weapons and put pressure on Washington to this end.\textsuperscript{16} To bolster German defence he readily accepted the French invitation for joint development of modern weapons.

\textsuperscript{16} Ahonen, op. cit., p. 34.
Strauss was an enthusiastic advocate of common research and joint procurement projects in NATO. For years he stimulated with unflagging zeal the debates on these issues within the alliance, initiated specific projects, and maintained a discussion on the establishment of a central agency for the coordination of research and development. He was not very successful; the alliance made no progress with coordination on research and development, while common production was limited to a select group of weapon systems, most of them of American origin. These projects did not diminish European dependence on American military equipment or give an impetus to a European production base.

The overall results of cooperative efforts in the research, development and production of modern weapons in NATO were poor, but bilateral contacts generally fared no better. Diverging economic and national industrial interests as well as technological difficulties stood in the way. The establishment of a European nuclear force by means of coordination in these fields turned out to be a dead end.

**Joint Ownership of Nuclear Weapons in NATO**

Ever since his appointment as Supreme Allied Commander Europe at the end of 1956 General Lauris Norstad had expressed growing concerns about the nuclear posture of the alliance. In particular he pleaded for a weapons modernization programme that would include medium-range ballistic missiles. Norstad thought European defence required a more extensive force, and he preferred second-generation IRBMs for this purpose. These missiles with solid propellants would be available in a few years time. Norstad wanted the

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missiles put under his command, even if the nuclear weapons would remain in American custody. Decision-making to use these weapons should rest with an executive committee in the alliance which would effectively make NATO the fourth nuclear power. Norstad favoured a strengthening of the European voice in the alliance, and he wanted a solution for German nuclear ambitions. However, both Washington and London disagreed with Norstad’s ideas. The plan directly undermined the basis of American policy since the beginning, namely the centralized control of nuclear weapons. The British were also worried about the German role in a future NATO nuclear force.

The Germans had been kept in the dark about US nuclear policy and changes in NATO nuclear strategy. Now the Federal Republic became more outspoken on matters of defence and began to demand equality within NATO. If allied forces were equipped with nuclear weapons, then the Bundeswehr should have them also. The Adenauer government decided to equip the Bundeswehr with delivery systems that were able to launch conventional as well as nuclear weapons, and readily accepted the deployment of American tactical nuclear weapons on German soil. The government was anxious about British and French efforts to acquire an independent nuclear force. The Federal Republic itself had renounced the production of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in 1954, but in the eyes of German officials this prohibition was not absolute, and the commitment was conditional upon the behaviour of their allies. With national nuclear forces in the UK

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21 Heuser, op. cit., p. 84-85.
and France in the making and growing concerns about the American nuclear guarantee, Germany was ready to explore alternative options to guarantee its security needs.

Chancellor Adenauer had always supported the overtures of his Minister of Defence to the French even if he was well aware that the latitude for action for Germany was limited, since disengagement was no option. Basically he agreed with the French that reform of NATO was necessary, and this issue had to be discussed with their main ally the United States. Simultaneously the German chancellor made abundantly clear to president de Gaulle that maintaining the Atlantic alliance was his first priority, and European political or military cooperation should never undermine this organization. It was in the interest of the Germans to strengthen the transatlantic bonds and keep up the integrated military structure of the alliance. Defence without the Americans was impossible and not in Europe’s best interest. Germany therefore greeted with enthusiasm the American plan for an allied intermediate-range nuclear force when it was introduced by Secretary of State Christian Herter to the North Atlantic Council in December 1960, one of the last acts of the outgoing Eisenhower administration.

But it turned out to be a false dawn. Relations between Europe and the new administration quickly became strained because John F. Kennedy, his Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk initiated major changes in American defence policy. They developed a new strategy (“flexible response”) and refused any further assistance to France to develop its nuclear weapons capability in order to control nuclear proliferation in Europe. Independent national nuclear forces were “dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent,” as McNamara stated in a speech in Ann Arbor in June 1962. It was essential

22 R. McNamara, “No cities” speech, Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 1962. Online, available
to secure the centralized command of nuclear weapons in the hands of the American president. Strengthening the conventional forces in Europe was of the utmost importance, and according to the Americans their allies had to increase their capabilities in this field. The Europeans on the other hand were disappointed there was no follow-up on earlier initiatives for an allied, or multilateral, nuclear force. The Kennedy administration attributed no priority to the plan for the multilateral force (MLF). It is probable they did not abandon the project completely, because they hoped that French and British nuclear forces could somehow be included. In Europe, and in Germany in particular, the fear increased that the US commitment to European defence would diminish. Between 1960-63 nuclear defence would become closely linked to the discussions on European integration. It seemed as if the US and Europe were no longer travelling along the same path.

French Patronage for Europe

As from 1960 Europe took priority over transatlantic relations for de Gaulle. At the end of July he met Adenauer at Rambouillet where he described in broad outline a plan for European political cooperation. He envisaged the establishment of new intergovernmental committees at the highest level and regular meetings between the ministers of the six countries of the European Economic Community (EEC). Political cooperation among the nation states in Europe would include defence as well, de Gaulle argued, and he foresaw close military Franco-German cooperation in particular.

The two major questions during this period were British entry into the EEC and the Fouchet negotiations on political cooperation. During the negotiations on the Fouchet plan discussions centred on the relation between a new European political union and existing organisations like the EEC and NATO. In January 1962 de Gaulle came up with a new draft, the so-called second Fouchet plan, in which all ties between the future European Political Union and NATO had been severed. French relations with the US had deteriorated since John F. Kennedy came to power and de Gaulle now adopted a defiant attitude, making no secret of his intention to detach Europe from the narrow transatlantic bond. This is one reason why his plan for a political union failed—another was the issue of British membership. Belgium and the Netherlands wanted to include Great Britain in the negotiations because they feared a Europe dominated by the Franco-German axis. A European Political Union would have provided France, the only continental nuclear power, with a dominant position in European defence. Would this mean that the French force de frappe could serve European interests? On several occasions French officials hinted at a Europeanization of the French nuclear forces if there was a political authority in Europe, but it is more likely, as Wilfrid Kohl and others have argued, that “the concept of Europeanization of the French forces was left purposely ambiguous.”⁹³ A political union was a remote possibility at best and it is unlikely that France would ever have relinquished control of the force de frappe to a European political authority without having the right of veto.

France was not the only country that held out hopes for a potential Europeanization of their national nuclear force. During the negotiations on British accession to the EEC Prime Minister Harold Macmillan hinted at an Anglo-French nuclear force. Several authors refer to a meeting between

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Macmillan and de Gaulle in June 1962 in Champs where the British prime minister suggested the formation of a French-British trusteeship group. Yet, with no follow-up and no specific plans developed, it must be concluded that Macmillan “evidently did not consider the nuclear force to be the entry ticket to the Common Market.”

About the same time the United States tried to breathe new life into the proposal for a multilateral force, a plan that held out the prospect of a greater say for the European countries as well. Following the crisis of confidence between Europe and the US at the end of 1962, this American plan would dominate the debate on nuclear issues. At that moment the American government decided to cancel the Skybolt, an air-launched ballistic missile, because there were better alternatives available. The British, however, had cancelled their own projects and decided to purchase the American missiles. The American decision was a bitter disappointment to the British government, and Macmillan demanded something in return. At a meeting in Nassau in December 1962 President Kennedy agreed to supply the submarine-based Polaris ballistic missiles to the British. This agreement was seen by other European countries as a reaffirmation of the special relationship. Events then happened in quick succession. The French veto against British entry into the EEC in January 1963 was followed by a French-German treaty of friendship and cooperation ten days later. Franco-German cooperation would become the nucleus of French diplomacy, while de Gaulle disqualified himself and hardly played a role in the debate on nuclear sharing within the alliance that became more intense after 1963.

Nuclear Sharing in NATO

In the Spring of 1963 the Kennedy administration took the initiative once more in the debate on nuclear sharing. They reintroduced the plan for a multilateral force. The plan now called for the creation of a fleet of twenty-five surface vessels equipped with two hundred Polaris missiles. Management, control and financing of the fleet would be the joint responsibility of participating countries. Joint manning was another essential element in the proposals; each ship would be manned by a crew consisting of at least three nationalities. For more than two years the MLF was the essential issue in transatlantic security relations. The most ardent supporters for a multilateral fleet were the Germans, while the plan met serious reservations in Britain, and France was not even consulted. Control of the nuclear weapons and the resultant authority to launch the missiles in times of crisis were naturally the key components. State Department officials held out the prospect of a greater say for Europe, but Secretary of Defence McNamara had serious misgivings about decentralizing control. Actually quite sceptical about the whole project, McNamara definitely wanted to retain complete control over the nuclear warheads. However, political considerations demanded that an improvement in the relationship with Europe took priority, and McNamara’s reservations were pushed aside.

In October 1963 a working group, comprising the ambassadors of eight member countries of NATO, started to study the technical, legal and military aspects of the proposal. This working group never succeeded in

coming up with a final solution with regard to the matter of political control. During the discussions Italy and Germany presented an amendment: If a European union with authority in the field of defence came into being, the treaty should be adjusted accordingly. Both the US and the European political authority should then have a veto to launch the nuclear missiles. The result would have effectively been an Atlantic alliance with two pillars. This so-called “European clause” is the closest that any initiative came to proposing a European nuclear force in the context of the Atlantic alliance. But the MLF never came into being, making the European clause nothing more than an amendment for future review in a draft treaty that never materialized.\footnote{I. Megens, “The Multilateral Force as an Instrument for a European Nuclear Force?” in V. Papakosma and A. Heiss (eds.), \textit{NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intra-Bloc Conflicts}, Kent, Kent State University Press, 2008, p. 106.}

By the end of 1964 the tide was definitely turning against the MLF. The French attitude stiffened because they were afraid of a bilateral Washington-Bonn understanding on nuclear weapons, while the Russians warned of the negative effects any nuclear force might have on the negotiations for a Non Proliferation Treaty in Geneva. Last but not least, the newly-elected British Labour government rejected the MLF plan and came up with an alternative proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force. The American administration, which had to take into account opposition in Congress as well, then decided to wait and see in order to avoid the impression the US wanted to push the multilateral fleet on their European allies. The German government was in fact the only European government that kept the MLF on the agenda in 1965. For them it was crucial to strengthen the link between the Atlantic partners, in particular in relation to the apparent rise of superpower détente and the alienation of France from NATO.\footnote{G.H. Soutou, “La France et la défense européenne du traité de l’Élysée au retrait de l’OTAN (1961-1966),” in W. Loth (ed.), \textit{Crisis and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969}, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 2001, pp. 21-47.}
The subsequent American proposal for a select committee of defence ministers to consult on nuclear issues therefore met with no great enthusiasm from the Germans.\textsuperscript{28} They were afraid this would replace the plan for a Multilateral Force, since only the MLF or a similar “hardware” solution would grant them direct access to nuclear weapons. McNamara took a different approach, since he wanted to improve both communication among the allies and consultation on strategic nuclear planning. His idea was in keeping with an earlier speech he had presented at the NATO meeting in Athens in 1962, where he had argued for new allied procedures to handle nuclear information. A special committee to study the proposals was established, but France declined to participate. Nevertheless a seven-member Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was created in NATO in 1966 as a forum to discuss nuclear planning. Although McNamara has always claimed his plan was not meant to undermine plans for a multilateral force, this was precisely what happened. As France withdrew from the military organization of the alliance, consultation among the allies increased. Germany—being one of the four permanent members in the Nuclear Planning Group—finally obtained a greater say in allied nuclear affairs. The NPG and the withdrawal of France also helped to reconcile differences over nuclear strategy, allowing the formal adoption of the flexible response strategy the US had favoured since 1962.\textsuperscript{29}

For American arms control policy, non-proliferation had become an ever more important theme. The declining support for the MLF in Europe and mounting pressure from the Soviet Union made a treaty in this field even more attractive. The Soviet Union wanted assurances against German nuclear ambitions. Even so, the first draft treaty the US tabled contained a provision which did not exclude transfer of nuclear weapons to a European


organization in which non-nuclear states participated. This would enable the Germans to participate in the control of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union fervently opposed such an option, while Britain also took a firm line and objected to the creation of an association capable of using nuclear weapons without the consent of existing nuclear powers.\footnote{J.P.G. Freeman, \textit{Britain’s Nuclear Arms Control Policy in the Context of Anglo-American Relations, 1957-1968}, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1986, p. 235.} Despite German misgivings President Lyndon B. Johnson decided to give in to Russian demands and ultimately reached a compromise that forbade “transfer of control directly or indirectly” but which allowed nuclear consultation within NATO.

The nuclear dilemma in the alliance was therefore solved by increasing the capacity for political consultation. Effective control of nuclear weapons stayed in American hands as the Non-Proliferation Treaty prohibited the transfer of nuclear weapons “to any recipient whatsoever.” Meanwhile discussions on the future of the alliance produced a compromise on the role of NATO, stated in the Harmel report. This position, which promoted détente while maintaining a strong defence, directed NATO towards “transforming itself into a more political and participatory alliance.”\footnote{A. Wenger, “Crisis and Opportunity: NATO’s Transformation and the Multilateralization of Détente, 1966-1968,” \textit{Journal of Cold War Studies} 6, 2004, p. 71; A. Locher and C. Nuenlist, “What Role for NATO? Conflicting Western Perceptions of Détente, 1963-1965,” \textit{Journal of Transatlantic Studies}, 2, 2004, pp. 185-208; O. Bange, “NATO and the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Triangulations between Bonn, Washington, and Moscow,” in A. Wenger, C. Nuenlist, and A. Locher (eds.), \textit{Transforming NATO in the Cold War: Challenges beyond Deterrence in the 1960s}, London, Routledge, 2007, pp. 162-181.} As a matter of fact the Europeanization of nuclear weapons was once and for all excluded. None of the later initiatives to promote European military cooperation, such as the “Eurogroup” comprising most European members of the alliance, the European Political Cooperation of the Six, nor the West European Union extended into the field of nuclear weapons.\footnote{Projects that aimed at the co-ordination of weapons production (like the Eurogroup) were contested by national interests, while political cooperation in Europe was a controversial issue.}
Incentives for a European Nuclear Force

Developments could have taken a different turn, as at the end of the 1950s several factors pointed towards the creation of a European nuclear force. In the end none of them was successful. French or British patronage for Europe was on various occasions put forward as a possibility, but in reality highly unlikely. The British did not want to jeopardize their privileged position vis-à-vis the United States, and they were anyway not yet a member of the European Community. Likewise, the French government put the national force de frappe first. With that as their starting point they searched for European partners, first and foremost Germany and subsequently Italy. But French-German cooperation soon ran into difficulties. Generally speaking, cooperation in defence industries provided an inadequate basis to expand on as national concerns and vested industrial interests prevented any quick results. Without official backing and continuous political pressure these attempts could not be successful.

All through this period politicians formulated vague ideas about a European nuclear force in the context of a more general discussion on nuclear sharing. A European nuclear force was a topic for debate, never a well-argued demand or a major political issue. No political parties identified with the demand for a European nuclear force, nor were there any lobby groups actively working in this field, even if there were well-known outspoken proponents like Franz Josef Strauss. Moreover, the most important precondition was still missing. Europe would have to speak with one voice, establish political institutions and achieve a greater degree of political unity before it could
acquire nuclear weapons. Only in the framework of European political unity could an integrated nuclear force be introduced. Yet the Fouchet negotiations directed towards achieving political cooperation in Europe yielded no success.

Due to differences of opinion Europe could not stand up to the US, and from 1963 onwards discussions focused on nuclear sharing within the Atlantic alliance. Once again, the debate was dominated by proposals put forward by the US, joint ownership of military forces (the “hardware solution”) as suggested by successive American administrations being the most important one. The plan for a multilateral force failed because the crucial matter of control could not be solved. The European clause to the draft treaty for the MLF or a European option within the Non Proliferation Treaty were only rearguard actions.

In reality there were few courses open to individual European allies. Member states could turn away from American pre-eminence, as France decided to do, or seek close cooperation and profit from American technical information and nuclear materials, like the British tried to do. Other West European countries like Germany either had no power to bring about these arrangements or tried to exercise influence on the US within the framework of NATO. The Nuclear Planning Group offered a way out for them and effectively helped to solve the problem of nuclear sharing among the allies. The European countries showed themselves satisfied with these changes. A European nuclear force then was out of the question, and in fact it had never been a viable option in the decade between 1957 and 1967.
Conclusion
Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America?

576

conclusion
For some reason—his 84th birthday is mentioned, but that is all—in September 1973 the *New York Times* decided to run a column of Walter Lippmann’s most incisive quotes. Naturally, his views on the transatlantic relationship were among them: “The natural allies of the United States are the nations of the Atlantic community: that is to say, the nations of Western Europe and of the Americas. The Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, which is an arm of the Atlantic Ocean, unite them in a common strategic, economic and cultural system.”

There is a certain poignancy to these words in 1973, one of the most tumultuous years in US-European relations. The notion that the US had “natural allies” was being revised. The Nixon-Kissinger reassessment of US foreign policy in an era of superpower Détente exactly wanted to deal with bilateral relations on a case-by-case basis, according to shifting US national security needs.

The conclusion that Lippmann’s vision of an Atlantic Community could no longer be taken for granted was exemplified by Henry Kissinger’s speech to the Associated Press at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York on 23 April in that same year. Kissinger explained his call for a Year of Europe in typically straight-forward terms. The post-war era shaped by the Marshall Plan, European reconstruction, and US domination of NATO was ending, and the relaxation of tensions with Moscow and Beijing was reshaping the global political context. Thus “our challenge is whether a unity forged by a common perception of danger can draw new purpose from shared positive aspirations.” The obstacles to this were very real, particularly long-running disputes over exactly the common strategic and economic system which Lippmann regarded as central to the whole enterprise.

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As we see in the chapter by Marloes Beers in this volume, Kissinger’s well-meaning gambit to open up discussion on what still held the two sides of the Atlantic together and what was driving them apart instead became drawn into the ongoing process of European identity-formation. The eventual response came not from the main European powers or even from the European NATO member-states but from the European Community itself, and it stated, in the words of Flora Lewis, that “there must be equal billing: Atlantic-Europe-United States.” This did not mean “downgrading the Atlantic Alliance” but it did “rule out hopes that it might somehow be expanded from a defense community into a group that would give common interests priority over national or regional interests in all kinds of fields—trade, currency and national resources, for example.”

As we mentioned in the Introduction to the first volume, ever since the beginning of the Cold War the transatlantic relationship had regularly been portrayed as being in a state of crisis. The aspirations for a genuinely functioning Atlantic Community as conceived by Lippmann could never be met, causing constant disappointment from the faithful. Would it be correct to regard the mid-1970s as a particular low point, along the lines of one volume that declared the post-war “Atlantic religion” to be dead? Some simple statistics would suggest that the term had far less currency in successive presidential administrations. Whereas a search for “Atlantic Community” and “Kennedy” in the New York Times database reveals 105 hits between


The understanding that US-European relations could no longer be disguised by the suggestion that they—unique in the world—functioned as part of a meaningful common community therefore became more and more apparent as the 1960s gave way to the 1970s. Despite Kissinger’s desire to remake and remodel the Roosevelt-Churchill Atlantic Charter of August 1941, his speech also indicated the dynamics that were undermining it. Firstly, the fact that the reduction of Cold War tensions was causing “new assertions of national identity and national rivalry” to emerge. The intrepid activities of the wide array of transatlantic (transnational) organisations from the late 1940s onwards went a long way to maintain a sense that Atlantic cooperation (if not unity) had become the new norm, something that fitted with how European integration was also apparently undermining the premises of the nation-state. But in the 1970s national interests began to prevail, both from a more self-confident Europe and a United States—at least prior to President Reagan—more on the defensive. Transnational ties inside the European Community also had, by that time, more intensity and depth than was possible at the Atlantic level because of the economic, political and legal development of the Community institutions. While the transatlantic groups continued to promote these ideas into the 1970s and beyond, there was an increasing air of wishful thinking about them. A fine example would be Elliot Goodman’s *The Fate of the Atlantic Community* published for the Atlantic Council in 1975, which still talked of possibilities for uniting “Atlantica”. One should not dismiss too quickly the influence of these institutions and their inter-mingling

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with the policy-making realm. After all, “perceptions... are as important as objective reality itself, for if individuals in the policy process believe their perceptions to be real, they are real in their consequences.” Nevertheless, by 1982 James Goldsborough of the Carnegie Endowment could only define US-European relations as demonstrating an “ethical deviation”—a fundamental (and growing) divide in how they viewed the world and how to deal with it.⁸

The other aspect of Kissinger’s speech that is revealing for our subject here is the inclusion of Japan. On one level there is nothing but sensible politics at work here. The United States is ready to engage Japan on a new level, just as it is looking for a new arrangement with Europe. It fits the end of the post-WW II paradigm and the forging of a new one. Yet there is also something striking about the words “the Atlantic community cannot be an exclusive club. Japan must be a principal partner in our common enterprise.”⁹ The implications are worth picking out. The community is not defined by territory but by an idea. This returns partly to Lippmann’s original formulations from both 1917 and 1944, since in each case, according to extenuating circumstances, he altered the list of member nations.¹⁰ At the same time, the uniqueness of the US-European relationship is coming into question. Kissinger wants to revive the idea, but precisely because the world has changed, making its original assumptions increasingly irrelevant. The same impulses lay behind the formation of the Trilateral Commission around the same time—the incorporation of Japan within a new transnational elite network (a move

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which met resistance from the transatlantic “traditionalists” of Bilderberg)."

In short, this is the moment when the Atlantic Community shifted from the Gemeinschaft of kinship to the Gesellschaft of rational contract—it exchanged the traditional image of civilisational unity for the realities of a modern negotiable partnership. While there have been outbursts of emotional attachment since then—during WW II memorials, and after 9/11 in particular—it is rational choice that increasingly dominates transatlantic relations.

Index
Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America?

584 index

Acheson, Dean, 61, 114, 116, 294, 343, 349, 352, 360, 403, 454, 456


Andreotti, Giulio, 553, 564


Ball, George W., 116, 157, 161, 173, 176, 178, 180, 184, 187, 190, 267, 316, 371, 394, 397, 401, 458, 464

Bator, Francis, 188, 268

Bernhard, Prince, 363, 373, 381, 382, 385, 387, 389

Bowie, Robert, 161, 402

Bowles, Chester, 458, 459


Bruce, David, 187, 197

Bundy, McGeorge, 113, 154, 157, 159, 163, 165, 170, 179, 180, 183, 185, 186, 191, 250, 413, 440

Callaghan, James, 185, 281, 554, 555, 568

Carlucci, Frank, 203, 204, 205

Cleveland, Harlan, 454

Cleveland, Harold van B., 121, 400

Couve de Murville, Maurice, 48, 120, 165, 345, 352, 358

Davignon, Etienne, 494, 500, 510


Dulles, John Foster, 22, 44, 45, 324
Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America?

Eden, Anthony, 310, 345

Eisenhower, Dwight, 21, 42, 47, 51, 74, 89, 107, 109, 211, 215, 313, 316, 348, 431

Erhard, Ludwig, 54, 158, 167, 170, 179, 183, 184, 189, 239, 246, 248, 251, 253, 255, 261, 266

Ford, Gerald, 204, 209, 230, 233, 407

Fouchet, 30, 90, 102, 241

Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry, 146, 523, 544, 563, 566

Greenwald, Joseph, 487, 497, 499

Hallstein, Walter, 74, 402, 409, 410

Harmel, Pierre, 35, 101, 122, 269, 359

Heath, Edward, 73, 323, 326, 335, 336, 338, 489, 491, 522, 531, 535, 544

Herter, Christian, 28, 423

Hillenbrand, Martin, 197, 199, 271, 285, 501

Huntley, James, 394, 400, 414, 424, 425, 426, 434, 438, 440

Jobert, Michel, 143, 146, 493, 516, 522, 544

Johnson, Lyndon B., 35, 109, 116, 125, 174, 179, 184, 186, 219, 222, 250, 256, 268, 471


Kiesinger, Kurt Georg, 189, 239, 257

Atlantic, Euratlantic, or Europe-America?

Index

I

Lemnitzer, Lyman, 111, 254
Lippmann, Walter, 168, 225
Lubbers, Ruud, 533, 539
Luns, Joseph, 39, 42, 44, 47, 50, 55, 58, 73

M

Macmillan, Harold, 30, 89, 113, 159, 270, 315, 318, 352
Marks, Leonard, 219, 222, 224
McCloy, John J., 116, 405, 413, 420, 434, 440
McNamara, Robert, 28, 34, 184, 185, 188, 191

N

Nitze, Paul, 349, 360
Nixon, 74, 130, 134, 195, 226, 231, 273, 299, 332, 337, 470, 472, 480, 484, 519, 541
Nogueira, Franco, 57, 450, 461, 462, 464
Norstad, Lauris, 26, 346, 348, 360

O

Owen, Henry, 268, 369

P

Peyrefitte, Alain, 94, 98

R

Rey, Jean, 64, 74, 411

S

Staercke, André de, 343, 346, 347, 360
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