For more than forty years the security alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty symbolised the common interests of Western Europe and the United States, and provided the context for all transatlantic political and economic relations. Yet the loss of a common enemy in the Soviet Union forced a reconsideration of the purpose of Nato and the mutual interests that still existed between Europe and the United States. These contributions build on this post-Cold War re framing of transatlantic relations and offer a multi-faceted study of the values, purposes, milieus and networks that underlay the Atlantic Community after 1945. For a long time the notion of “Atlantic Community” was a widely used phrase denoting a taken-for-granted state of affairs—the organization of the West in front of the Soviet threat—with very little conceptual clarity behind it. It is now an opportune moment to focus on and problematise this concept from a historical perspective. In particular, the chapters consider what it meant, how the transatlantic intellectual and policy-making elites sought to convey it to their national publics, which circles supported it, and what the effects were in social life as a whole.
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The Transatlantic Imaginary: Constructing the Atlantic Community during the early Cold War

Valérie Aubourg and Giles Scott-Smith
Mars, Venus, and the Cultural Cold Wars

This book originated during the transatlantic tensions surrounding the Iraq war. As the movement towards a US military intervention progressed, both diplomatic circles and public opinion in America and Europe seemed to be swept along in a maelstrom of misunderstandings perfectly captured in Robert Kagan’s influential article “Power and Weakness”. Narratives about transatlantic relations became increasingly dominated by the “Mars and Venus” paradigm, according to which the divergence of the US and Europe seemed to mean the inexorable loss of common values and worldviews, in particular regarding the perception of threat and the use of power. If Europeans and Americans did not “share a common view of the world, or even (...) occupy the same world” anymore, then the end of the Atlantic Alliance and certainly the demise of any “Atlantic Community” seemed imminent. The dominant image of the early 21st century was therefore one of a break-up or at least a profound transformation of the transatlantic relationship.

To historians however, the cliché of the unbridgeable “value gap” and estrangement between the US and Europe did not appear very satisfactory. First of all, it represented something of a neoconservative interpretation of transatlantic history, well argued but obviously oversimplifying European positions and neglecting the considerable investment of the US in the international order established after the Second World War. More importantly, the theme of a deep Atlantic crisis was by no means new. Although the post-1945 period has been claimed as a kind of “golden age” in contrast to the upheavals of the early 21st century, it too witnessed a recurring cycle of tension concerning the extent of US political and economic power and cultural influence in Europe. McCarthyism and the Suez crisis are obvious early points of reference in this cycle, but from the 1950s onwards there was a constant stream of declarations on the “troubled partnership”,
ranging from claims about the “transatlantic crisis” and the “Atlantic fantasy” to despair about the “widening Atlantic” or, according to a Council on Foreign Relations study, “Atlantis Lost”. Similar to Kagan later, Chace and Ravenal in *Atlantis Lost* described the transatlantic relationship in the mid 1970s as “the disintegration of the Atlantic community in a series of ad hoc and bilateral arrangements, thinly covered by the fossilized face of NATO and other Atlantic institutions”, a process rooted in the changing nature of power and the devaluation of the centrality of US-European relations in global politics. For these authors, no return to the old-time “Atlantic religion” seemed possible. From a long-term historical perspective, therefore, the themes of Euro-American estrangement and transatlantic crisis are an inseparable part of the post-war transatlantic experience, as are the strong emotions arising from these recurring tensions, lived anew each time the cycle of crisis returns.

But it has not just been the Atlantic Community that has come under scrutiny in recent years. The fall-out from Iraq had an impact on debates surrounding the European Union, an entity that also resonates in interesting ways within the history of American policy towards Europe after the Second World War. Iraq blurred the perceptions of the EU held by Americans at a time when the Union was drafting a new constitutional treaty, a situation made ironic by the fact that the European Constitutional Convention was presented as a founding moment in European history similar in significance to the Philadelphia Convention. The bitter exchanges between Americans and Europeans were certainly present in the background of the European Convention’s work, and transatlantic disputes became intertwined with the EU’s internal debates. What is more, the renewed interest in Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis following September 11, with its theme of Western democratic values and regional unity as vital tools in the war against terrorism, frequently became superimposed on the debate over a
crisis of Atlantic values. The resulting lack of clarity in the whole discussion only highlighted more the need to reexamine the concepts being thrown around and used and abused in equal measure.

In addition to the recent political context, it was also an opportune moment from an historiographical perspective to reassess the Atlantic Community concept. After the end of the Cold War, the loss of a common Soviet enemy seemed to demand a reconsideration of the purpose of the Atlantic Alliance and the mutual interests that still existed between Europe and the United States. As part of this process, historical scholarship began to re-examine and re-interpret the Cold War period, making use of new archival sources, alternative approaches, and theoretical perspectives. Several studies have aimed at re-evaluating transatlantic relations and the interplay between Alliance politics and European integration in particular. Three trends formed the backdrop to these explorations in diplomatic history. Firstly, there was the “cultural turn” that demanded a greater appreciation for the role of ideas and ideology, not only in terms of policy formation but also in terms of everyday life in the Cold War period. Connected to this was a long-running debate concerning the meaning of “Americanization” and the many varied processes that have been a part of it. Secondly, an expanding body of historians began to re-examine the identity and purpose of the various institutions involved, bringing attention to bear on Western “state-private networks” and the intricate relations, both covert and overt, between private groups and governments outside of the formal foreign policy-making apparatus. Thirdly, there was a push to “internationalise” Cold War history by opening up and disrupting the standard narrative with multiple perspectives gathered from up-till-then ignored or inaccessible sources.

Ideology and culture have been key themes in the re-conceptualization of Cold War history over the past two decades. There have been several useful general analyses of the culture of the Cold War, looking at how
everyday life was influenced by the ideological struggle, particularly in the field of race and gender relations. Many studies have also focused on the manipulation of cultural products, concepts and mass media in the struggle between the Western powers and the Soviet bloc, leading to attempts to compare experiences on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Particular emphasis has been given to the effort to “get the message across”, recording and analysing the history and practice of (US) public diplomacy and the development of psychological warfare and propaganda programmes. State-private networks in various fields have been studied in some detail, including labour, youth, and the arts, with special attention often being given to the involvement of the CIA. In the intellectual field the most famous example has been the Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF), which sought to gather together a transnational network of public figures and academics to denounce Stalinism and defend the cultural values of the West. The revelations in the late 1960s of large-scale funding from the CIA has severely complicated the CCF’s historical legacy.

With this volume we wanted to both draw on this burgeoning post-Cold War research and extend it by investigating the many-sided meanings of the Atlantic Community, a concept often invoked during the Cold War but with longer roots and a continuing resonance into the 21st century. The aim was to gather together investigations covering national, institutional, and individual perspectives, particularly highlighting non-US views and uptill-now lesser-known actors. We also sought to lay out in some detail the complex links it has with the “European idea”, appreciating the different emphases placed on the Atlantic and the European in different political, economic, cultural, and geographic settings. This volume therefore takes on the immediate post-Second World War period, encompassing the crystallization of the Atlantic Community idea and its relation with the nascent European Community in the 1940s and 1950s. The second volume, also to appear with
Soleb, will cover the negotiations and developing strains between Atlanticist and European perspectives through the 1960s and early 1970s. The two volumes therefore chart the progression of thinking on Atlantic and European affairs, and the changing political context which framed it, during the crucial decades following the Second World War.

**The Conceptual Framework:**
**Exploring the Space of Atlanticism**

The articles in this volume represent approaches covering two broad fields of enquiry. Firstly, the importance of ideas and values. Was the notion of an Atlantic Community, indicating common strategic interests, shared values, and a common destiny, simply a product of Cold War rhetoric? Was it no more than a useful euphemism to evade the realities of the “Americanisation” of Europe and the unwelcome fact of American hegemony within the Alliance? Or did it justifiably represent a new development in Western civilisation, based on a common political and economic model and defined around a genuine consensus on key issues between Europe and North America? How did views on the Atlantic Community differ on both sides of the ocean? How was it promoted for a wider public? What were the “common Atlantic values” so frequently found in the documents of the time? How did the Atlantic Community notion—and close variations such as “Atlantic commonwealth”, “Atlantic Partnership” or “Atlantic alliance” (in a non-institutional sense)—combine with existing understandings of “The West”, “The Free World”, “The Occident”, or the construction of Europe itself?

Secondly, the relevance of policies and personalities. How was this Atlantic Community concept put forward in political and economic (elite) circles at the time of the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Treaty? How does the
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How did the Atlantic Community concept evolve in the postwar period, when European organizations were discussed and created? How did these new European institutions fit into a larger Atlantic Community framework, in the view of their American or European promoters? How did the Atlantic Community concept resonate within different policy fields and across various policy-making networks? Through which channels was it publicized in Western Europe and North America, and how was it received by public opinion? In charting these developments we also hoped to identify a series of “memory sites” as defined by Pierre Nora—moments or specific events with symbolic significance, places and cultural artefacts, or personalities (whether mythical or real) that encapsulated the construction of the memory and identity of the Atlantic Community.

More broadly, we sought to understand what the Atlantic Community idea represented in an international framework characterized by the East-West conflict, and how it had been historically constructed in various settings. We operated with three main assumptions: that the Atlantic Community, as a regional notion, was a product of the representations and imagination of individuals and groups in the sense of Benedict Anderson’s “imagined communities”, and of the communication and discursive strategies of particular actors; that it was rooted in and produced by specific political contexts and expressed a distinctive political representation of the world; and that it performed a legitimizing function for institutions, political movements, and asymmetric power relations operating within the transatlantic relationship. Through these assumptions we wanted to track the actors who produced and—not necessarily the same ones—who reproduced and disseminated the Atlantic idea and its narrative. The Atlantic Community concept justified particular institution-building, which in turn justified an Atlantic Community. But there were clearly limits to what this circular movement could achieve in the practical world of policy-making. Individuals and institutions invested political, cultural, symbolic, and economic capital and
developed specific tools and activities to give weight to the concept because it encapsulated their worldview and furthered their interests. The radical transformation of transatlantic affairs promised by some may not have occurred, but this does not rule out the transitory effects of this concept across several decades of North American-European relations.

The “Atlantic Community” phrase is difficult to deal with because it encompasses two notions: Firstly, a community and secondly a regional entity. The notion of a community can be misleading because it has a more elastic meaning and use in English as compared to other languages, a situation that can be illustrated through national case studies that clarify particular contexts and usages. Thus, for example, the French “communauté” usually implies some formal or institutional arrangement, while the English word can refer to a much more loosely defined group. In German, “Gemeinschaft” points to closer and more organic links between its members, as opposed to the looser “Gesellschaft” (society). The community must also be distinguished from an “association” or a “partnership”, which, as André Kaspi observed, carries connotations of a business-type relationship in which there can be a junior and a senior partner. Partnership would imply cooperation between a European and an American partner, while a community goes further than this dual structure by placing all the participating states on the same level. From the perspective of political science the associate concept of “political community” is relevant here: A social group in a given territory who recognise their shared identity and purpose and who therefore develop a framework for decision-making authority to pursue common goals. It is highly significant that major works on transnational political community were published precisely in the 1950s. The influential functionalist studies by Ernst B. Haas, in *The Uniting of Europe*, and Karl W. Deutsch, in *Political Community at the International Level* and *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, contributed to the interest among political scientists
in the processes and mechanisms of political community, in a decade that witnessed the creation of intergovernmental organizations and the emergence of the European Communities. Deutsch and Haas tried to understand how political communities could be created, and in some respects encouraged, at the transnational level. From the 1950s through to the 1990s, scholarly analysis of (and sometimes advocacy for) Atlantic political community rose and fell according to the changing political context between North America and Europe. The vagueness of the Atlantic Community concept’s institutional content was criticized by promoters of a more integrated Atlantic organization like Clarence K. Streit, who preferred “Atlantic Union” to identify the federal structure he had in mind. But from the late 1940s up to the early 1960s the geopolitical and intellectual zeitgeist seems to have been particularly conducive for the production and reception of an “Atlantic Community”, however it was supposed to be understood.

The regional character of the Atlantic Community also does not add much conceptual clarity, since there has never been a consensus on what the “Atlantic area” is, and even less of what an “Atlantic country” is. For the purposes of this book, the “Atlantic Community” is taken as a social-cultural construct that seeks to legitimize a regional identity—in other words, a “space of Atlanticism” through which and around which to mobilize representations, ideas, and indeed ideologies. As geographers, historians and scholars of the renewed field of (critical) geopolitics have shown, especially by incorporating the methodologies of Gramsci, Foucault, and more recently Edward Said, there is an intimate connection between space, knowledge and power. Maps as well as narratives were crucial tools for the constitution of modern states and nations, allowing them to identify borders, assert ownership and legitimacy, control their territory and populations, and foster a common identity rooted in an image of the state and a narrative of its origins. In addition to their role in building nations as “imagined communities”, maps helped
shape “imagined geographies”, to use Said’s phrase—spatial representations developed by the colonial powers and projected onto their empires as tools of power and instruments of hegemony.28

The title of this book, “Atlantic Community, European Community?” exactly plays with these multiple meanings and invites a reconsideration, both temporal and spatial, of the geopolitical upheavals and reorganizations that occurred in Europe as a result of the Second World War and the Cold War. In a time of tremendous change in the distribution of power, perceptions of “Europe”, “America”, “East” and “West” shifted rapidly and radically, entailing a reconstruction of the imagined geographies of Europe. These mental maps were crucial because, combined with appropriate mythologies and archetypes, they both helped shape the outlook of political leaders and decision-makers and could be put to use to capture the imagination of the wider public. And because they played a role in fixing identities they clearly influenced diplomatic negotiations, arrangements in political economy, and alliance politics. Many of these mental maps had a longer lineage dating back to the 19th century, such as “Mitteleuropa”, “Eurasia”, and “Paneuropa”. After the Second World War the Mitteleuropa idea, in both its Habsburg and Imperial German versions, vanished into the bipolar division of Europe. The traditional image of Europe as the center of imperial power in the world was unraveling. In the Western part of the continent, overlapping and competing visions of a “United Europe”, a “European Community”, a “Third Force Europe”, a “Nordic Community” (Norden), a “Euro-Africa”, an “Atlantic Community” or a renewed “West” developed instead, each projecting a specific vision of the European heritage, imagined geography, identity and role in the world.29

Analyzing the interplay between the Atlantic and European Community concepts thus allows us to go back to Edward Said’s analysis of the hegemonic power of mental maps. Who imagined the Atlantic Community in the 1940s and 1950s? To whom was it projected? What were its purposes? Was
it a purely American concept to be understood in the framework of the Cold War? It was certainly a powerful antic-Communist propaganda tool in the ideological war of the late 1940 and 1950s, supporting and legitimizing US military and political involvement in Europe. The Marshall Plan saw the United States attempting to reshape the soci-economic structure of West European nations through a vast modernization and productivity program, a task backed up by a massive information and propaganda campaign. At the very least this nurtured debates on how Europeans saw themselves and how they conceived their relations with North America in an “Atlantic” setting. At the same time, as Volker Berghahn has argued, another cultural cold war was being waged by the United States against their non-Communist critics in Western Europe, and an Atlantic Community discourse was a useful device to foster common Euro-American cultural and political affinities. Nevertheless, all these interpretations offer US-centered visions. What about Canada, a North American country with an intimate link to Britain and the Commonwealth and its own unique interpretations of the Atlantic Community? What about European visions of the Atlantic Community, on which there is much less information? Not all Europeans were supportive of a Six-country, highly integrated European Community, instead favouring alternative (larger and less integrated) conceptualizations of Europe within an Atlantic frame. For instance, a better understanding of European conceptualizations of the Atlantic Community would clarify further Lundestad’s important “empire by invitation” thesis.

**Organisation of the Book**

In the complex set of ideas, emotions, historical references and geopolitical visions that grew around the Atlantic Community concept, it was Lippmann and Streit, both journalists and publicists, who in many respects
played the role of founding fathers. In his “Notes on Lippmann” that opens this book, Ronald Steel reminds us that Lippmann coined the “Atlantic Community” phrase in 1917, during the first World War, and that it soon provided the perfect image for countries linked by a common civilization and the “vital highways” across the Atlantic ocean. Streit, who defined his vision of the Atlantic Community as a union with a federal structure, was also an influential figure during the following World War, as Lara Silver argues here. The Atlantic maps of wartime calmly marked out the boundaries of geopolitical upheaval.

In the following chapters we have arranged the contributions around five main themes. The first part provides general perspectives on the mechanisms involved in the dissemination of the Atlantic Community idea. Both David Ellwood and Volker Berghahn offer larger interpretative frameworks to understand the uses and development of the Community. While Ellwood reflects on the purpose of the geopolitical narratives used by the United States in Europe from the Marshall Plan to the Atlantic Alliance, Berghahn introduces the case of the Ford Foundation, evaluating the successes and failures in attempting to bridge transatlantic intellectual and cultural differences. Looking at the issue from a long-term perspective, Lara Silver analyzes the use of metaphor in the rhetoric used to construct and present an Atlantic Community to the public. Finally, Giles Scott-Smith studies how American public diplomacy, and in particular US exchange programs, sought to make selected European elites receptive to US interests by fostering an Atlantic identity within a US informal empire.

A second part presents case studies on national conceptualizations of the Atlantic Community. Cornelia Constantin looks at the French case through the twin myth of “Bidault the Atlanticist” and “Schuman the European”, while Frédéric Attal examines Italian views through the personality of Ugo La Malfa, a leader of the Italian Republican Party who situated
himself somewhere between European and Atlanticist positions. Victor Gavin looks at the British conceptions of the European and Atlantic ideas during the negotiations for the European Defense Community, while Klaus Schwabe and Denis Stairs offer a synthesis of the views of German and Canadian leaders towards the Atlantic Community and its links with Europe.

The third part examines relations between European institutions and America. Using diplomatic records and the US version of the *Bulletin de la CEE*, Gerard Bossuat paints a broad panorama of the Atlantic Community proposals throughout the 1950s and how they related to European integration. Transatlantic perceptions are further explored by Alexander Reinfeldt in his chapter on the European Coal and Steel Community’s information policy in Washington, and by Birte Wassenberg in the debates at the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Catherine Fraixe provides us with a useful counterpoint in showing how New York’s Museum of Modern Art and the covertly-funded American Committee for a United Europe projected the idea of “European art” in the early 1950s, resulting in further tensions for an Atlantic identity.

As the main institution that crystallized and disseminated representations of an Atlantic Community, NATO deserved special attention. In part four, three papers evaluate the impact of NATO’s institutional development in the 1950s on the crystallization of a community feeling. Ine Megens looks at the working relationship between national representatives and the Secretary General and his staff. Andrew Johnston examines NATO’s Temporary Council Committee, which in 1951 tried to reconcile strategic and military requirements with the politico-economic capabilities of the NATO countries. David Burigana presents the activities of the Advisory Group for Aernautical Research and Development (AGARD), attached to the Standing Group, as an area of transnational cooperation of scientists and engineers promoted by NATO. Two other papers deal with the role of NATO information
policy in defining and projecting an Atlantic Community, with Valérie Aubourg investigating NATO’s partnership with non governmental organizations and Bernard Ludwig tracking the debates and tensions surrounding its activities in anti-Communist propaganda.

Part five deals with the delicate question of borders, margins and limits by looking at countries whose presence in the Atlantic Community and NATO was complex or contested at some point, providing interesting insights into the ways an Atlantic identity was constructed over time. Marco Mariano describes how Italy became “Atlantic” through the pages of Henry Luce’s influential Life magazine. The shifting definitions of Europe, the West and Turkish identity are explored in Paul Kubicek’s paper, and the paradoxical issues concerning Portugal’s membership of NATO and the Atlantic Community are analyzed by Luis Nuno Rodrigues. Finally, two papers discuss the interesting cases of countries whose “Atlantic” nature was not questioned, but which nonetheless experienced shifting and contrasting experiences. Jenny Raflik looks at American military bases in France and their influence, be it negative or positive, in generating an “Atlantic spirit”. Gert van Klinken, by focussing on Dutch international law professor and Calvinist party member Gezina van der Molen, investigates how a staunch supporter of NATO as an essential force in opposing the Communist threat could still come to doubt the meaning of the Atlantic Community.

Whether there was or is an “Atlantic Community” is still a matter of debate. What all of these contributions show is how the imagined geographies of the Atlantic Community, be they political, economic, social, or cultural, were closely intertwined with the needs of war and Cold War. Yet it is not as if the Cold War was always a decisive factor. There was a general need to define a West in which Americans, Canadians and West Europeans could project their respective (and multiple) identities, and this had a longer history. Certainly, these needs were unable to nurture a truly transatlantic
institutionalized community, and without this foundation interests and identities continued to shift over time. This is the basis for the tensions of the 1960s and 1970s as the European Community came to occupy a more definite place in international affairs, and it is also an interesting background for the disputes witnessed since the end of the Cold War itself.

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European Community, Atlantic Community?

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According to Anderson, members of the community cannot all interact directly with each other but develop a mental image of their affinity and fraternity, which was a crucial stage in the formation of nations. See B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London and New York, Verso, 1983. Anderson’s work also points out how important communication was (especially the large-scale print media) during the construction of nations in the 18th and 19th centuries, allowing for the development of a common language and discourse which crystallized national identities based on imagined communities.

See the work of sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, who made an influential analytical distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society). He defined the former as the space of representations and memories, family and kinship, and local ties to neighbours and friends, and the latter as the space of rational relations between individuals who exchanged goods and services and where civic relationships could be developed. Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960.


See his well-known books Atlantic Union Now (1939) and subsequent variations, and the Atlantic Union Committee he founded in 1949.


V. Berghahn, America and the Cultural Cold War, op.cit.


Walter Lippmann
and the Invention
of the Atlantic Community

Ronald Steel
The Atlantic Community cannot be found on any map. But it is nonetheless real. It exists in the minds of people from California to Central Europe. It cuts across borders and cultures and links peoples in a common destiny. It is an essential component of the mental map of the world held by Europeans and Americans. It is so basic and widely-accepted that we take it for granted.

But it was neither inevitable nor self-evident. The Atlantic Community did not simply happen. It had to be created and nourished from many parts. It had to be implanted in people’s minds as important and even necessary. In this effort no American, and no single person on either side of the Atlantic, did more to create and nourish that concept than did Walter Lippmann.

As America’s leading political journalist and authority on foreign affairs for more than six decades, Lippmann tirelessly insisted to Americans that their fate was linked to that of Europeans. They were bound together, he maintained, not only by sentiment, but by self-interest and necessity. Through his widely-read newspaper columns, magazine articles, and books he helped build a strong Atlantic bridge in the minds of Americans.

Normally journalists are not accorded high positions in the hierarchies of statecraft. Those ranks are generally filled by monarchs, rulers, generals and diplomats. But Lippmann was a very special kind of journalist: virtually unique in America and unheard of in Europe. He was what we could call today a public intellectual, or even a public philosopher. Over his six-decade career he wrote a widely-syndicated newspaper column, hundreds of articles, and a score of books.

When the United States entered the European war in 1917 he was chosen to work on the plan that became Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points to evolve the post-war political settlement. Working with a team of geographers and historians he helped redraw the map of Europe.
After the war he became editorial director of the New York daily paper, *The World*. A decade later, in 1931, he created the first major newspaper column dedicated to public affairs. Appearing three times a week in more than two hundred newspapers across the United States, Lippmann’s voice educated and guided Americans over the next forty years.

From World War I through the American war in Vietnam no one had a greater impact on public opinion than Walter Lippmann. And no one argued more tirelessly that Europe and America were component parts of a common civilization—that by geography, culture and necessity, they formed an *Atlantic Community*.

Lippmann first presented the notion of an Atlantic Community not during World War II, nor in the mid-1940s at the onset of the Cold War. Rather he introduced it thirty years earlier, in 1917, when Europeans were locked into a self-destructive war they were incapable of ending. They were subjecting to ruin and devastation not only their own countries, but peoples everywhere who suffered from the impact of their dynastic struggles. At that time Lippmann was a young editor at a weekly journal of opinion called *The New Republic*. It had been founded in 1914 by a group of young reformers who were progressive in their politics and sympathetic to innovation in the arts. They were considerably influenced by similar reform movements in Europe, and particularly by the Fabians in Great Britain. Like many young Americans, Lippmann had given little thought to foreign affairs before 1914. Rather he was absorbed in the great domestic reform movement in America led by Theodore Roosevelt and later followed by Woodrow Wilson. But the war in Europe, as it caused ever-greater destruction and human carnage, forced the editors at the magazine to evolve a foreign policy.

In a war among feuding empires—Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary—what position should the US take? The argument for neutrality was powerful. None of the combatants was innocent. President
Wilson had told Americans that they must be “neutral in thought and in deed.” Wilson, however, was clearly more sympathetic to Britain and France than to Germany and its ally. So was Lippmann. In his editorials he increasingly identified American neutrality with pacifism, or what he dismissed as “passivism” and “irresponsibility.” By the spring of 1916 he told his readers that the United States must “no longer be neutral between violator and victim” and must use “its moral power, economic resources and… military power against the aggressor.”

Over the next year he continued to stress security as the major reason why America should come to the aid of Britain and France. This culminated in February 1917 in an editorial he entitled “The Defense of the Atlantic World.” There he argued that the United States was part of a community of states bordering the Atlantic. An attack on an integral part of that community was a threat to America’s own security. Germany’s war against Britain and France, he told his readers, was a war “against a civilization of which we are a part.” By cutting the “vital highways” of the Atlantic powers, Germany threatened the lifeline of what he called—coining a phrase that was to become the very definition of a new concept of geopolitics—the “Atlantic Community.” America’s entry into the war broke the stalemate on the Western front and assured the victory of Britain and France. However the quarrels among the Allies over the spoils of war, the harsh peace imposed upon Germany, and the unwillingness of the United States to join the League of Nations, alienated Americans from the very notion of an Atlantic Community. Not for another quarter century would it be resurrected.

During the 1920s and much of the 1930s the United States retreated from its commitment to Atlanticism. And so did Lippmann. By the mid-1930s Hitler’s destruction of German democracy, and the failure of European democracies to join forces against Nazism, convinced him that Europe was heading for war. But he believed that America must stand apart.
A “cold appraisal of the American interest […] seems to me to lead to a conclusion that we can contribute nothing substantially to the pacification of Europe today”, he wrote in 1935. His argument for neutrality rested on the assumption that the Atlantic would not fall under the control of a hostile power. However Americans could remain neutral, he cautioned in June 1937 (Foreign Affairs), “only so long as we feel that there is no fatal challenge to the central power which makes for order in our world.” That “fatal challenge” was soon to occur. The Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 shook the assumption that Americans could find safety in neutrality. Lippmann, like so many others, believed that Britain could, with the help of American arms, maintain control of the North Atlantic, and thus preserve American interests.

The capitulation of France in June 1940 stunned Lippmann, as it did so many others, and swept away his cautious equivocations. Suddenly America itself seemed in danger. The Atlantic Ocean no longer assured protection, but rather vulnerability. Lippmann changed course. Now he espoused openly the argument that he had used twenty-five years earlier: America’s security was vitally connected to Britain’s independence and Anglo-American control of the Atlantic. For emphasis he quoted from his 1917 article in which he had written that the “safety of the Atlantic highway is something for which America should fight.”

Impelled by the new threat to American security Lippmann shed the remnants of his Wilsonian hope that peace and security could be found in disarmament, international law and world government. The refusal of Europeans to unite against Hitler had nearly resulted in Nazi domination of the Continent. From this he drew important lessons. Early in 1943, believing that Americans must start thinking strategically about the peace that would follow the defeat of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan, he brought out a short book entitled US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. It made a great impact on American public opinion and remains a classic manual of statecraft to this day.
In a chapter significantly entitled “The Atlantic Community”, he highlighted the British-American connection as the “crucial point” in American foreign relations. Through Britain the members of the far-flung British Commonwealth also played an important role in American strategy. Because of the bases and resources they offered, they were the advance outposts of America’s defence.

The Community he described was far more extensive than the one he had outlined in 1917 at the outset of World War I. As members of this extended Atlantic Community he listed not only the English-speaking “dominions” of the British Commonwealth—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Eire and South Africa, but also Spain, Portugal and the twenty Latin American republics. In doing so he cut across cultural lines to sketch a geographical concept of security.

Within Europe the nations he described as being “vitally involved in the system of security to which we belong” were France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Norway. “The Atlantic basin is not the frontier between Europe and the Americas”, he wrote in explanation of this long list. “It is the inland sea of a community of nations allied with one another by geography, history and vital necessity.”

In effect he drew upon the same argument that he had used in 1917 in the article he had entitled “The Defense of the Atlantic World.” There, nearly thirty years earlier, he had insisted that “the safety of the Atlantic highway is something for which America should fight.” That highway had, for him, become more central than ever.

For Lippmann the concept of the Atlantic Community had a double purpose. First, it was to guide Americans away from a vague Wilsonian internationalism that failed to distinguish vital from peripheral interests. Such a shallow notion ignored the vital importance of alliances and spheres of influence, he maintained.
The second purpose was to counter what he saw as wishful, or utopian, thinking. He particularly had in mind political leaders such as Wendell Willkie. In his popularly acclaimed book, *One World*, the Republican candidate for President in 1944 had conjured an international parliament that would unify “all the peoples of the earth in the human quest for freedom and justice.”

Lippmann was also concerned by the glibness of Henry Luce’s prescription for an “American Century.” In a widely-distributed pamphlet of that name the publisher of the influential weekly magazines *Time* and *Life* had written that the United States was destined to “assume the leadership of the world.” Rejecting both the idealistic belief in world law, and also the imperialistic vision of an American Century, Lippmann grounded his foreign policy in national interest and alliances. Only through alliance, he wrote, could the Great Powers assure their post-war security. America and Great Britain must remain linked by the Atlantic connection, and Russia, for its part, must be brought into what he called the “nuclear alliance.”

The “primary aim of American responsibility”, he stressed, was “the basin of the Atlantic on both sides, and the Pacific islands”—in other words, the Atlantic Community plus a “blue water” naval defence of America’s Asian interests. Only a year later, in 1944, he reinforced the centrality of the Atlantic Community in a book he prosaically, but pointedly, entitled *US War Aims*. Defining it as an “oceanic community”, he expanded his earlier list by including Sweden, Greece, Italy, and Switzerland. However, and most significantly, he pointedly excluded the states of Eastern Europe liberated from the Germans by America’s wartime ally: the Soviet Union. These states, he observed, clearly had “strategic connections… not with the Atlantic sea powers but with the land power of Russia.” He now accepted what the tides of war had made inevitable. In the post-war world there would be three centres of power, or “orbits”: an Atlantic orbit, a Russian orbit, and eventually a Chinese orbit. If united, the victors could maintain the peace; divided they would be sucked into a new world war.
What Lippmann was proposing, of course, was spheres of influence: a well-tested formula that had kept the peace in Europe throughout most of the 19th century. This was the view that seemed to be taken by President Roosevelt shortly before his death in April 1945. But it was out of key with the expansive visions of an American Century held by his successors, and with Stalin’s own ambitions.

By 1947 Lippmann’s vision of an Atlantic Community based on spheres of influence and great power cooperation seemed cramped and restrictive. A new generation of policymakers had created a West German state from the American, British and French occupation zones in Germany, and organized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a military alliance sustained and directed from Washington. The dividing lines between eastern and western Europe grew deeper. The two Europes were to grow further apart before they began to knit together in the 1990s. But the intellectual foundation of a united Europe has remained the concept of an Atlantic Community.

In this successful endeavour to build an Atlantic Community no single person played a more creative and influential role than Walter Lippmann—an American intellectual without a political portfolio, but with a pen that helped change the geography of the world.
Framing the Atlantic Community: Reflection on Transatlantic Exchanges and Strategies of Dissemination
From the Marshall Plan to Atlanticism: Communication Strategies and Geopolitical Narratives

David W. Ellwood
So now we know. It was *Soft Power* that won the Cold War. Harvard professor Joseph Nye’s formulation, which dates back to 1992, has made his fortune. Google now lists more than 80 million references to the notion, and no week passes without some new discussion of its relevance for the modern world, especially in the continuing contrast between America (‘hard power’) and Europe (‘soft power’).¹

In the book which sums up his thought on ‘soft power’ Nye explains that the competition over interpretations, credibility and persuasion is crucial in the age of information. “The world of traditional power politics is typically about whose military or economy wins. Politics in an information age may ultimately be about whose story wins.”² Nye’s argument is weakened however by his presentation of specific conflicts and outcomes. In this view some of the most hard-fought wars of recent years all turned out to be little more than propaganda battles: Milosevic and Serbia, Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden’s videos, Saddam Hussein and the absence of WMD.

But the notion of a winning or hegemonic *story* has more potency than Nye’s formulations would have us believe. In an interesting new book from Paris, the Asia specialist Karoline Postel-Vinay launches—or re-launches—the notion of the *geo-political narrative*, and asks us to reflect on the past and present of the West by way of the history of some its dominant narratives. From the land which gave us the connection between power and discourse and then ran away over the metaphysical horizon with it comes an analysis which shows how world views become narratives, how narratives rise to dominance, and how conflicts between ideologies, great powers, and regions of the world can be understood best in terms of *les grands récits géopolitiques*.³

American geopolitical narratives of course have a central role to play in the Postel-Vinay view. From ‘manifest destiny’ onwards—a classical geopolitical narrative—have come a steady stream of inventions in the world of *grands récits géopolitiques*, forcing others to comply, compete, or be excluded.
The ‘Open Door’, the ‘14 Points’, ‘the Good Neighbour policy’, the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations, the ‘Cold War’ (a metaphor re-invented by a journalist, Walter Lippmann, which gave the US a monopoly on definitions of the biggest conflict of the age), the Truman Doctrine (in material reality an aid policy for Greece and Turkey), the European Recovery Program (turned into the Marshall Plan by the Press for rhetorical reasons), and finally in this sequence the Atlantic Community (another Lippmann re-invention).  

Postel-Vinay implies that the US has a special, indeed distinctive inclination to turn its policies and world views into geopolitical narratives. This is not just spin (a rhetorical technique meant to amplify the persuasive power of some choice or line). Nor is it a media-led practice in the democratic market place. Nor is it just didactic/explanatory, serving the information needs of an isolated domestic audience. The development in early 1990s American debates of a notion such as globalisation shows that, better than any other in the twentieth century, American power has understood the need to conjugate reality and its representation. Only in this way can a geopolitical narrative achieve its maximum “veracity effect”, structure visions most successfully, and exert its most effective authority.

The point of this essay is to compare two specific geopolitical narratives from the early Cold War—the Marshall Plan and Atlanticism—to see some of the different ways geopolitical narratives were constructed in the West in the post World War II era. The analysis will also try to show how the reinvention of America’s capacity to project its power in those years also involved a constant experimentation with communication strategies and hence explicit and implicit narratives. Does this present the age-old conundrum between medium-and-message? Not exactly, since the interweaving of political, economic and narrative impulses in the processes of representation of was always much more complicated than that little epigram would suggest (though it should not be ignored or abandoned).
The European Recovery Program (ERP)

From the very beginning the Marshall planners had been aware that to tackle the political obstacles their efforts were likely to encounter, they would have to go over the heads of the local governing classes and speak directly to the people. Navigating by sight, the teams of journalists and film personnel who launched the ERP Information Program turned it, by the end of 1949, into the largest propaganda operation directed by one country to a group of others ever seen in peacetime. A January 1950 report by Mike Berding, the ERP information director in Rome, instructed: “Carry the message of the Marshall Plan to the people. Carry it to them directly—it won’t permeate down. And give it to them so that they can understand it.”

No idea seemed too large or daring for the Information Program in its heyday. As long as they were directed at workers, managers, or employers, the key concepts everywhere were greater production and productivity, scientific management, and a single-market Europe. In each country there were specialised publications on these subjects, joint committees, trips by European leaders to inspect American factories, conferences and eventually, in some places, even ‘productivity villages’ where model factories and workers’ communities could be seen in action. For other groups in society—state employees, teachers, families, even schoolchildren—the promises of the American information campaign were more jobs, higher living standards, and ultimately peace in a Europe without rivalries. The Information Program eventually produced tens of documentary films, hundreds of radio programs, thousands of copies of its pamphlets, and attracted millions of spectators for its mobile exhibitions.6

Here posters, models, illuminated displays, audio messages and films would present the Plan as graphically as possible, for every level of understanding. A booklet from a display at the Venice exhibit of summer
1949 opens with a dramatic quantification of the aid arriving at that time: three ships a day, $1000 a minute, two weeks’s salary from every American worker. The goals and the methods of the Program are explained in everyday language, with the details explaining how work has been restored to lifeless industries, how new machinery has modernised factories and how greater output needed to be integrated Europe-wide to facilitate the movement of labour and stabilise economic life on a continental scale. The concluding messages states that ERP is a unique chance offered to European nations towards reconstructing their economies, raising the standard of living among the masses, and attaining by the year 1952 an economic stability which is the foundation of political independence... Every worker, every citizen is bound up in this rebirth. The future and the peace of Italy and of Europe, the general well-being of all, depend on the will and the work of each single one of us.7

The challenge for Marshall Plan communicators was not just to raise production but to raise productivity, not just to bail out bankrupt governments but to modernize the State, not just to encourage international cooperation but to push for an integrated European market, not simply to save ailing industries but to change the war between reactionary capitalists and revolutionary workers into a dynamic relationship between enlightened producers and contented consumers. America triumphant showed how all this could be done: “You Too Can Be Like Us” was the implicit message of the Marshall Plan.8

None of the West Europeans nations were in any condition to challenge this kind of ideological power openly, or to develop alternatives. The only government which tried, the British, failed miserably.9 In the East stood the Cominform, the Soviet-bloc bureau set up in November 1947 with the explicit aim of generating a massive propaganda counter-offensive against the Marshall Plan in Western Europe as well as in its own sphere. In a country
like Italy, scene of the first great ideological clash in the Cold War with the general elections of April 1948, two all-encompassing geopolitical narratives could be seen fighting it out head-to-head.\footnote{10}

The Marshall Plan was special because it was temporary, very intense, and organised in close cooperation with the private sector of US business and the trade unions, but it was special above all because it was an operation in mass propaganda. As a narrative of modernisation, the Plan played a major role in introducing to European political culture the concept, the language and the techniques of economic growth—an ever-expanding prosperity for an ever-expanding majority—and demonstrated its success through ever-increasing productivity across and within Europe’s economic systems. As a specific geopolitical narrative the ERP launched the concept and practice of \textit{European economic integration} on its distinguished contemporary career, of course limiting the concept of ‘Europe’ in this vision to West of the Iron Curtain, and indeed strongly discouraging any intercourse with the Eastern half. Up to then the plaything of a tiny group of visionaries, the Marshall Plan turned European integration into one of most serious political priorities of the age, and provided the means to set it in motion. How the Europeans dealt with or even resisted this challenge is another story. But they certainly had no alternative discourse of their own, and were more than happy to accept a form of conditional dependence as long as the Program kept functioning.\footnote{11}

\section*{NATO and the Atlantic Community}

NATO’s history was characterised from the very beginning by a great deal of restlessness among its partners about the precise meaning of the transatlantic bargain struck in the name of western defence mobilisation. In comparison with the ERP, which was explicitly temporary, NATO would clearly endure
as long as “the threat” persisted, which everyone agreed would be for a long time. The birth of the Atlantic Community, dreamed of by statesmen since the end of the nineteenth century and part of the common language thanks to the writings of Walter Lippmann and others, was accompanied by a great deal of hand-wringing.

Still young, the community—or was it just a coalition?—was expected to compensate for many a lost historical prospect:
— for the Americans, the dwindling of the vision of a single world government via the United Nations;
— for the British, their inclusion with the European “indigents” in the American conception of “Europe”;
— for the imperial powers, the reduction of their world status through the process of decolonization;
— for all the West Europeans, their dependence on American charity and arms and their loss of sovereignty;
— for Germany’s ex-enemies, the necessity of sharing with her a new life-or-death struggle;
— for the Germans of the Federal Republic, the losses of the war, the occupations, and the country’s division;
— for all those who saw themselves as nations in a single European civilisation, the loss of the East;
— for all who now lived in dread of atomic war, the collapse of the great wartime dreams of organising the peace and prosperity of the postwar world on a rational, cooperative basis.

One version of the compensatory mechanism was well illustrated in the Italian case by Ennio Di Nolfo in 1986: “…the Atlantic occasion […] was a chance for Italy to recover its national role: to be in Europe, to be equal in Europe, to be for Europe. The Atlantic choice thus helped to substitute other formulas for the old nationalistic ones, without changing any basic
values. It was the culminating point in the policy aimed at the recovery of national position, in a different but not dissimilar dimension, inspired by the models of power politics experienced in the past.”

Seen in these terms, the Soviet challenge, far from destabilising the postwar order—which did not exist—appears as the only force strong enough to ensure that the ‘Atlantic Community’ would function adequately to meet all the requirements addressed to it. Nothing had gone according to plan. Only by brilliant improvisation and a vast investment in new political and economic resources were a series of arrangements put in place to stabilise the relationship between each nations’ internal equilibria and its international commitments in the new era.

The point of the North Atlantic pact in its original pre-Korea form was foremost psychological and political reassurance. According to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, “the essential objective is increased security, not increased military strength”, while the key to the capacity of treaty-signers to resist attack “depends primarily upon their basic economic health”. Specifically, this meant increased industrial capacity and the development of labour resources, clearly fundamental objectives of the Marshall Plan. Yet the treaty contained one element which seemed to presage a significant expansion of its ambitions and responsibilities, beyond the immediate security sphere. This was Article 2, known as the ‘Canadian article’ in honour of its sponsor and framer, the Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson. The Article states:

“The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.”

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European Community, Atlantic Community?
From the Marshall Plan to Atlanticism: Communication Strategies and Geopolitical Narratives
Pearson explained his purposes in an article which appeared in *Foreign Affairs* just as the treaty was signed. Previous such pacts had been formed to meet specific emergencies and had then been abandoned when the crisis was past (like the anti-Hitler league which had nominally created the UN, suggested Pearson implicitly).

“It must not be so this time. Our Atlantic union must have a deeper meaning and deeper roots. It must build up habits and desires of cooperation which go beyond the immediate emergency. By ministering to the welfare of the peoples of its member states, it must create those conditions and desires for united effort which make formal pacts unnecessary.”

At first sight it looks as though it was the pressure of the emergency which relegated the importance of Article 2. Yet a reading of the minutes of the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s principal steering body, shows paradoxically that questions about Article 2 increased after the Korean outbreak in June 1950 brought the East-West confrontation to a new high of intensity and danger. Never has our Alliance commitment been more sorely tested, said the European members, never has there been greater need to explain our purposes, build legitimacy, reinforce our authority for needs well beyond the moment. Although talked about at the Council’s fourth session in May 1950 and in the press, only after the opening of the Korean war (in September 1950 in fact) did NATO decide to equip itself with a Director of Information. However, he was only provided with a “small subordinate staff”, which would work through individual governments.

Here was the start of the paradox at the heart of Atlanticism.

A preliminary reading of the NATO archives reveals that whatever its other achievements, the creation of that world view and social institution was not one the Alliance sought or claimed. NATO as such never developed this official capacity, not at least in the form of a *grand récit géopolitique*, capable of explaining, structuring, and legitimising its aims and purposes at all levels of society. People such as Bevin and Schuman demanded a “simple
constructive project of equal vigour” to the fervour of the Communists, and said that the Communist use of poverty as a political weapon should be met with iron promises of industrial development, as promised by the ERP and its legacy. But collective security with peoples one had fought against only yesterday was hard to imagine. What was needed, said Bevin, in a May 1950 North Atlantic Council meeting, was “a declaration of faith, of great strength and character”, in the future of the West.17

This impulse, reinforced in later meetings by De Gasperi, Stikker, and even Acheson himself at one point, eventually in late 1951 gave birth to the short-lived Atlantic Community Committee.18 But it produced a report and then suspended itself. While paying tribute to the need for developing the Atlantic Community spirit on a wide scale, the members quickly recognised: —a) That cultural, informational and propaganda campaigns should be the province of national governments above all;
—b) That NATO’s role “would appear to be primarily one of stimulation and encouragement of discussion and contact between interested groups and promoting the freer exchange of ideas”;
—c) That the “habit of consultation” should be the guiding principle of all discussions on method,20 together with respect for the prerogatives of existing organisations (this would neutralise NATO’s impulse to promote economic action), and the development of specific and concrete measures within a general direction, rather than the realisation of any grand design.21

This was October 1951, about the time Greece and Turkey were joining the Alliance, after Eisenhower had arrived as Supreme Commander, but before NATO as such had been formally constituted. Eisenhower was to prove a keen supporter of information and education efforts, and had told the first top-level NATO meeting on information policy, in April that year, that “the coalition will exist and prosper in direct proportion to the confidence and support given it by the free peoples of our several countries. This, in turn,
depends wholly upon the effectiveness and honesty of the information that reaches them.” But the tone of this key meeting quickly changed when reality was grasped. The Chairman—Deputy Chair of the Atlantic Council itself—immediately ruled out a central organisation, and insisted on local efforts first. The newly appointed head of the NATO Information Service, a little-known Canadian official, said he was beginning late with almost no resources. National information services would be key, but some nations had none, some several, and some directed attention overseas instead of developing mechanisms for domestic education. He foresaw the development of a “facilitating service of minor proportions”, nothing like the United Nations’ Department of Public Information which had 400 people and a budget of $3-4 million. In 1953 he would still point out that his office disposed of one twentieth of one per cent of the figure the Soviets were spending on propaganda.

The delegates to the April 1951 gathering quickly brought out some of the differences which separated them. A Norwegian demanded a world-wide organization, but with a special focus along the Iron Curtain, from Finland to Yugoslavia. The Italian delegate made an eloquent plea for the policy later called ‘roll-back’. The Portuguese speaker said there must be no question of defending capitalism “which is a word—we must admit—hated by the great European masses.” He also rejected “the super-imposition of influences from outside”, and the “creation of hegemonies.” The British speaker worried about the costs of re-armament and how they would be “sold” to the Brit public. The President of Paix et Liberté, the militant psychological warfare group sponsored by the CIA and the US unions, insisted that “like should be fought with like”, the opponent should be defeated with his own methods, including of the clandestine variety. The points on which all seemed most agreed was that the Soviet propaganda challenge was strong, and successful, and that the West had nothing to match it. Their success in capturing the word Peace, and making it into a sort of trademark, was evident to everyone.
From this meeting came a series of small initiatives and meetings. In August 1952 the projects planned included an edition of NATO stamps, the creation of new visual symbols, a photographic contest, visits by journalists and non-governmental associations, and revealing exhibits on life beyond the Iron Curtain. The Secretary General had proposed a long list of other activities, such as NATO Youth Camps, sports championships, exchanges, and inter-parliamentary visits. But they seemed to have remained mostly proposals, and a November 1952 report again emphasised the centrality of national information programmes. A re-dedication to the ‘battle for men’s minds’ was demanded by the Secretary General Lord Ismay in February 1953, but again there was above all respect for the national programmes.

In spite of this, national representatives complained that too little was being done, that the Soviets were winning all the propaganda battles, and that a true NATO feeling of mutual understanding and solidarity was lacking. But at a time when American public diplomacy, cultural efforts, propaganda and psychological war were running at a height never seen before or after, perhaps it was inevitable that this should be the case. Then again the US Secretary of State in the formative years, Dean Acheson, was evidently never keen for NATO to function as anything other than a military organization, and said so very bluntly at the beginning. The changeover to Dulles seems to have made no difference to this sphere of Alliance activities. Meetings were called, reports written, but very little happened; the military challenges continued to dominate and five years would go by before the so-called ‘political’ dimension was formally recognised.
Outside NATO

Whether the movement for Atlantic unity had as distinguished a pedigree as that for European integration by 1949 is an open question, but it was certainly stronger.\textsuperscript{31} Leaving aside the special British Anglo-Saxon version, its contemporary incarnation had been born with Clarence Streit’s \textit{Union Now} of 1939, followed by a series of American books on similar lines, and particularly after the use by Walter Lippmann in 1943 of the phrase ‘Atlantic Community’, taking off from the Monroe Doctrine and the wartime Anglo-American alliance.\textsuperscript{32} After the great success of Streit’s book, which aimed for a union of western democracies and their empires as the nucleus of a world government based on a federal structure, movements began to grow.

“The return to Europe obviously did not represent a return to the past”, writes the Canadian historian John English. “It represented rather an imaginative response to a threatened tradition that even an isolationist Lodge could now regard as a treasure…”\textsuperscript{33} Canadians and Americans alike made common cause to defend their shared notion of Western Civilisation, says English. At Harvard James Conant brought that canon into the heart of general education, and Arthur Schlesinger, like Lester Pearson, extolled the tradition of ‘democratic liberty’ in \textit{The Vital Centre}. Parents bought Robert Hutchins’ ‘Great Books’ for their children in greater quantities than ever before… The sense that these books, that tradition, and those experiences had had a very close call in the 1930s and 1940s nourished the roots from which NATO emerged at mid-century. The strength of those roots explains its endurance; without them it would have withered in the bitter winds later in the century.\textsuperscript{34}

Few today can imagine the strength of the so-called movement for Atlantic Union in its strongest years from 1949 to 1963, including—unlike the European integration movement—a strong, unofficial American component.
In 1949, in parallel with the negotiations for NATO, a group of more than 800 leading Americans launched the Atlantic Union Committee, to promote the idea of a “Union of Atlantic democracies much more integrated than the Atlantic Alliance.” A leading Senator, Kefauver of Tennessee, followed the Senate’s ratification of NATO with a formal call for a convention of delegates which would open the way to an Atlantic constituent assembly.35

The Atlantic Union Committee in the US was an influential body, whose high point was probably the ‘Declaration of Atlantic Unity’ of 1954, signed by 244 leading citizens of 9 NATO countries (including Truman, Marshall and Acheson for the US). This document called for a radical strengthening of Atlantic institutions after the collapse of the EDC plan.36 This produced the so-called Atlantic Parliament (still in existence), the great Atlantic congress of London in 1959, the Atlantic Institute in Paris, and the movement which transformed the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) of the Marshall Plan days into the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1961.37

The high point of this wave was the Atlantic Convention of Paris of January 1962, explicitly modelled on the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 which set out to draft a constitution for the federal United States. This one was meant to do the same for a Federation of Atlantic nations. The proposed framework included a permanent High Council, an Atlantic Assembly, an Atlantic High Court of Justice, and an Atlantic Economic Community.38 Enthusiasts included Jean Monnet, who spoke of the extraordinary transforming power of common institutions. The issues raised by nuclear weapons, the underdeveloped areas, the monetary stability of our countries and even their trade policies, all require joint action by the West. What is necessary is to move towards a true Atlantic Community in which common institutions will be increasingly developed to meet common problems.39
The Convention produced a resounding Declaration, which lacked nothing in solemnity and self-importance. But it was a strange moment. The Convention explicitly welcomed “the spirit of President Kennedy’s recent statement that a trade partnership should be formed between the United States and the European Economic Community.” Six months later came Kennedy’s Grand Design and the declaration of interdependence in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, which openly referred to the uniting of the 13 colonies as a precedent for what might be achieved by the construction of a true “Atlantic partnership”.

But critics soon noted the limits of Kennedy’s vision. There was no talk of federations, no impulse to build new institutions, no reference to the Atlantic movement or the Paris convention. In fact the Kennedy impulse soon faded, finally killed off by de Gaulle’s challenge, which highlighted every aspect of the political and strategic falsehoods which he saw underlying the Atlantic system. But Kennedy’s efforts had also been attempts to bring European responsibilities into line with the realities of power in the Atlantic system as the Americans saw them. Lucid commentators on the spot warned the Kennedy Europeanists that times had changed and their efforts would not succeed. Ronald Steel’s *End of Alliance* of 1964 was particularly prescient: in the sense that it seizes upon the new kind of loyalty being created in Europe, and upon the desire to be both separate and different from America, Gaullism is far stronger than de Gaulle and is likely to outlive its chief exponent just as Bonapartism survived the demise of Napoleon.

**What is Atlanticism?**

By 1965 it was possible to list 10 major private groupings which had worked or were still working to promote the Atlantic idea. They included the Atlantic Treaty Association, with 15 national member groups; the Congress of European-
American Associations, the International Movement for Atlantic Union (the original federalists with Streit still at the head), the Bilderberg Group, and the Atlantic Institute in Paris.\textsuperscript{44} It was possible to talk of the emergence of an Atlantic ruling class,\textsuperscript{45} or as Charles Maier has put it, of an “imperial culture” led by an Atlantic elite with “semi-sacral status: Marshall, McCloy, Lovett, Spaak, Monnet, and other ‘wise men’ who exhorted to common effort and cooperation (…) transatlantic trips, common foreign policy forums, a network of clubby associations for talk and mutual self-regard created in effect a transnational ruling group.” Maier goes on: Below this summit, a cadre of international civil servants served in Paris, Washington and elsewhere. Within two decades subsidiary networks arose around think-tanks, banks, unions etc. (…) mastery of English would become the cultural passport for every claimant to élite status…\textsuperscript{46}

But was this elite happy with the outcome of all its efforts at networking and influence-sharing? There is reason to think not. “Closer Atlantic assimilation automatically flows from closer European integration”, affirmed a prominent American writer in 1969.\textsuperscript{47} But this never happened, and the reasons it didn’t could be masked by Atlanticism, but not resolved by it. Another member of the elite, Harlan Cleveland, had said bluntly in 1965 that from their Atlantic relationship “Americans expected something better—much better” than what had been realised by that time. He explained: They expected an Atlantic relationship in which conflicts of national interest, far from growing, would gradually give way to increasing cooperation, and in Western Europe’s case, to supranational union. They were not prepared to find themselves involved in the seemingly indefinite exercise of power which is no longer unambiguously desired by their European allies.\textsuperscript{48}

Canadian historians, writing from the perspective of the inventors of Article 2 and for whom Atlanticism was most explicitly a normative term, lamented the “dismal failure” of that project, and noted Secretary of State Acheson’s suspicion of Canadian L Pearson’s “canting Methodism”.\textsuperscript{49}
Atlanticism was always much more than support for NATO, and much more than the set of related institutions such as the OECD and the GATT. Canadian commentator Robert Wolfe said “it has a geographic base, but is most significantly a social institution (...) an organizing principle that helps us to see a pattern in a set of shared expectations among the participating countries…” Wolfe quotes the international relations theorist Robert Keohane in support of his arguments. The Atlantic area is a zone of “complex interdependence” where conventional definitions of power have been superseded. Instead peaceful, constructive relations depend on the more or less conscious management of “rules, expectations and conventions”, a means of communication (dominated by English), and “a mixture of beliefs and knowledge (all human constructs) about language, geography, history and culture…” This returns us to the issue of stories and narratives.

Which then has survived best, the myth of the Marshall Plan or ‘Atlanticism’? Of course, the former has not since been tested in anything like a comparable situation, despite repeated calls for new Marshall Plans. After the fall of apartheid South Africans called for a Marshall Plan. After the fall of the Berlin Wall Eastern Europeans and Russians demanded the Marshall Plan they had been denied by the Soviet Union in 1947. The break-up of the Yugoslav republic provoked a similar demand. The Italian government demanded such an operation for Palestine. Fearful of further disintegration in Africa, the British government proposed in 2005 coordinated international intervention on the lines of the Marshall Plan. One report says that the resource transfers from West to East Germany each year since the fall of the Wall were equal in volume to the whole of the European Recovery Program. But the intra-German effort was never cast in those terms by anyone. The myth of the Plan had become as forceful as its true historical legacy, but was never put to the test.
NATO of course continues to exist, and is tested every day. After the fall of the Wall, Secretary of State James Baker declared “America is a European power” and called for a Kennedy-style renewal of the Alliance. In November 1990 came the joint ‘Declaration on US—EC Relations’, which celebrated decades of shared values, experience and aims, swore fresh allegiance to NATO, and at the same time recognised the “accelerating process by which the European Community is acquiring its own identity.” All that followed from this was the Summit of Madrid in 1995, which saw the President of the EU, the President of the US and the Secretary General of NATO meet together formally for the first time. The Gulf and the Yugoslav crises, the transformations of Russia and Germany, the enlargement of the EU and its economic stagnation, and the Euro-Dollar contest have all tested the old narrative to the limits. But none has brought it closer to collapse than the Iraq war.

In the views of many, two different conceptions of the West seem to be taking root which offer contrasting visions of the meaning of the West’s Enlightenment heritage at the level of moral values. Alain Minc, the French political commentator, Ian Buruma, the Anglo-Australian writer, Peter Schneider, the senior German novelist, and Javier Solana, former Secretary General of NATO and now the head of EU foreign policy, have all expressed the same sentiments. Solana talks of a “moral certainty of religious America (which) is hard to replicate in secular Europe.” Minc mentions the philosophical differences apparent in the links between religion and the State, on abortion and the death penalty, on the purposes of politics and war as a crusade. But it is Peter Schneider who best articulates what is at stake now: Europeans think that Americans are on their way to betraying some of the elementary tenets of the Enlightenment, [the notion for instance] that human judgements and decisions are fallible by their very nature. In its language of power the Bush administration has created the opposite impression, establishing a new principle in which [Americans] are “first among unequals”. [Meanwhile]
Washington accuses Europe of shirking its international responsibilities, and thus its own human rights inheritance. But as Schneider underlines, the dilemmas this situation provokes cannot readily be resolved within the usually-accepted confines of the Enlightenment heritage: Who is the true advocate of human rights? The one who cites international law to justify standing by while genocide takes place or the one who puts an end to the genocide, even if it means violating international law?

Minc—like Jurgen Habermas—suggests a transatlantic divorce must now take place, preferably painlessly, which means ‘no’ to anti-Americanism, ‘yes’ to realising there are important security and economic interests we all share, but different values of reference. Never was there a greater need for a commonly recognised “European individual”, he suggests. Similar sentiments have driven Cardinal Ruini’s effort to counteract the tendencies driving a historical split over values, Garton Ash’s various statements on the widening transatlantic divide, and the transatlantic declaration of intellectuals recently presented at the Brookings Institution.56

The split, if such it is, may have been developing for years. “The danger of American democracy is that it always endeavours to expand a majority into unanimity”, said Robert Mead nearly 40 years ago, “thus the constant drive to uniformity and consolidation.”57 The creation and projection of narratives is at the heart of these efforts, and one which the rest of us have great difficulty in matching.58 The lessons of the Marshall Plan and Atlanticism are clear, especially today. Unless the EU can find its own geopolitical narrative, it will fail to justify, explain or legitimise its own ‘cosmologie locale’, its own little experiment in local universalism, not just to the world, but to its own people.59
European Community, Atlantic Community?

From the Marshall Plan to Atlanticism: Communication Strategies and Geopolitical Narratives


5 Postel-Vinay, L’occident, p. 143


13 Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe..., p. 123.

14 The North Atlantic Treaty is accessible at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm


20 Ibid., p. 32.

21 Ibid., pp. 26-34.

22 Minutes of NATO International Information Meeting, 12-14 April 1951, S-AC-0010/001, NATO Archives, Brussels. The presence at the meeting of Roscoe Drummond, the head of Marshall Plan information in the ERP’s Paris headquarters, shows a moment of continuity between the two organisations, but it seems to have been rare.


24 Ibid. n. 21.

25 NATO Secret Document AC/24-D1 and Consideration of NATO Information Projects, 21 August 1952, AC/24-D/5, IS-AC-0190, NATO Archives, Brussels.

26 Ibid. n. 22.
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28 Minutes of North Atlantic Council, First Session, 17 Sept. 1949, C/1-R/1, IS-AC-0001, NATO Archives, Brussels.


30 See reports in New York Times, 8 February and 26 April 1953, and 11 Oct. 1954 (the latter after the collapse of the European Defence Community project).


33 English, op. cit., p. 38.

34 Ibid., p. 319.

35 Hartley, op. cit., pp. 52-58, 61-63.

36 The first version was published on 3 Oct. 1954 in the New York Times.


39 Cited in ibid., p. 71.

40 Ibid., p. 97.


42 Mead, op.cit., p. 192.


51 Ibid., p. 131.

52 Ibid., pp. 153-154.

53 La Repubblica, 14 May 2005.


58 Remarks by the Chancellor of Oxford University, Chris Patten, St.Antony’s College, Oxford, 1 March 2006.

59 Postel-Vinay, op. cit., p. 200.
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